Beyond Patronage:

Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability

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While the end of the twentieth century witnessed a proliferation of studies of democracy and democratization, the beginning of the twenty first century has seen an explosion of interest in the dynamics of authoritarian rule.[1] Within this new literature, an important line of research focused on the role of political parties in sustaining authoritarian rule. Beginning with Geddes' (1999) influential finding that single party regimes are more stable than military regimes or personalistic dictatorships, scholars have pointed to a range of ways in which ruling parties enhance authoritarian durability.[2]

Yet not all authoritarian parties are alike. In Cuba, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam, authoritarian parties possessed powerful mass organizations with cells that penetrated virtually every neighbourhood, village, and/or workplace in the country. Other ruling parties are mere organizational shells. For example, the base organizations of the Marxist People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB) were never more than "paper structures" (Decalo 1990: 124);[3] Cambodia's ruling communist party (KPRP) had only 1000 members in the mid-1980s (Peou 1999: 99), and by decade's end, it was "disintegrating from below" (Gottesman 2003: 329, 212-213). Authoritarian parties also vary in terms of cohesion. Whereas ruling parties in Georgia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Zambia suffered large-scale defection in the face of economic crisis and/or opposition challenges in the 1990s, ruling parties in Cuba, Malaysia, Mozambique,

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[1]See Geddes (1999); Ross (2001); Bellin (2004); Way (2005); Smith (2005, 2006); Magaloni (2006, 2008); Brownlee (2007a); Przeworski and Gandhi (2007); Greene (2007); Pepinsky (2009); Levitsky and Way (2010); Slater (2010).

[2]See Geddes (1999, 2005); Smith (2005); Way (2005); Magaloni (2006, 2008); Brownlee (2007); Reuter and Remington (2009); Slater and Smith (2009); Levitsky and Way (2010); Slater (2010). Geddes (see Smith (2005); Reuter and Remington (2009). Also see the classic work by Huntington (1968, 1970).

[3]Autocrat Mathieu Kérékou complained in 1985 that the PRPB's "very small number of members" had not permitted the "setting up of the proper party structures" (Allen 1992b: 67).

Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe remained intact—despite crises that were as severe or worse.

This variation matters. Party-based authoritarian regimes differ considerably in terms of their durability,[4] and as Samuel Huntington (1968, 1970) and Benjamin Smith have argued, this variation is rooted, to a considerable degree, in party strength. The impact of party strength was made particularly manifest in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when economic crisis and the end of the Cold War challenged single party regimes throughout the world. Where ruling parties possessed cohesive mass organizations, as in Cuba, Malaysia, Mozambique, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe, regimes often survived these challenges; where ruling parties lacked such organizations (e.g., Benin, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Zambia), economic crises and/or opposition challenges triggered large-scale elite defection and, in many cases, regime collapse. The key to authoritarian stability, then, is not the existence of a ruling party *per se*, but rather the *strength and cohesion of that party* (Huntington 1970: 5-9; Smith 2005).

With few exceptions,[5] the literature on parties and authoritarianism has not taken seriously variation in party strength, particularly along the dimension of ruling party cohesion.[6] Much of this literature treats patronage or opportunities for career advancement as the primary source of party cohesion.[7] Indeed, it is precisely the capacity of ruling parties' to organize

[4]See Smith (2005).

[5]Important exceptions include Huntington (1968, 1970); Smith (2005), and Slater and Smith (2009).

[6]Thus, Smith (2005); who pays considerable attention to party strength, focuses on party organizational strength (or what we call scope), rather than on cohesion.

[7]See in particular Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2007); Magaloni (2008).

patronage distribution and assure political elites of future career opportunities that is said to enhance authoritarian stability (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007).

This paper argues that patronage alone is not a very effective source of elite cohesion. Institutionalized patronage may preserve elite unity during normal times, but it is often insufficient to ensure elite cooperation during crises. When–due to economic crisis, presidential succession, the rise of a strong opposition challenge, other crises—the ruling coalition's hold on power is seriously threatened, parties that are bound together by patronage often suffer large-scale defection, which can undermine regime stability (e.g, Zambia in 1990-91, Senegal in 2000, Kenya in 2002, Georgia in 2001-2003). The most durable party-based regimes are those that are organized around non-material sources of cohesion, such as ideology, ethnicity, or bonds of solidarity rooted in a shared experience of violent struggle. In particular, parties whose origins lie in war, violent anti-colonial struggle, revolution, or counter-insurgency are more likely to survive economic crisis, leadership succession, and opposition challenges without suffering debilitating defections. Following Huntington (1968: 324), then, we argue that the stability of a party-based authoritarian regime "derives more from its origins than from its character."

We apply this argument to four competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. All four of these cases were established single- or dominant-party regimes. In 1990, all four ruling parties had been in power for at least a decade. Yet the cases differed in critical ways: whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, ruling parties in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging party and regime outcomes in the 1990s and 2000s. Although all

four ruling parties confronted serious economic crises and strong opposition challenges, UNIP and KANU imploded (and eventually lost power) in these face of these challenges, whereas Frelimo and ZANU remained largely intact and survived.

Violent Conflict, Party Strength, and Authoritarian Durability

As Samuel Huntington argued four decades ago (1968), political parties enhance authoritarian stability. They do so in various ways. For one, they mobilize support, which can be critical to either deterring challenges (Magaloni 2006) or defeating them when they arise (Levitsky and Way 2010). Party organizations provide an infrastructure for clientelist distribution and play a central role in delivering—and stealing—votes.[8] According to Geddes (2005), they may even deter coups. Many authoritarian parties also play a coercive function (Widner 1992a, 1992b). Ruling party cells, "youth wings," and other grassroots structures may be used to monitor and suppress opposition, transforming them into an "extension of the state's police power" (Widner 1992a: 8).[9]

For many scholars, however, parties' primary contribution to authoritarian stability is through the management of elite conflict.[10] By providing institutional mechanisms for rulers to reward loyalists, and by lengthening actors' time horizons through the provision of future opportunities for career advancement, parties encourage elite cooperation over defection (Geddes

[8]For example, the Mexican PRI's vast organization allowed it to become "one of the world's most accomplished vote-getting machines" (Cornelius 1996: 57); yet at the same time, it served as a disciplined and effective mechanism for carrying out ballot stuffing and other forms of fraud (Cornelius 1996: 60, Carbonell 2002: 85).
[9] In Kenya, for example, KANU served as an "adjunct to the security forces in monitoring and controlling opposition," deploying its "youth wing" to "patrol the country, instill support for the party, and monitor dissent" (Widner 1992a: 7, 132); and in Taiwan, the KMT's extensive network of informers was deployed to "keep watch over neighborhoods, factories, military units, businesses, and government offices" (Hood 1997: 59).
[10]See especially Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2007); and Magaloni (2008).

1999: 129; Brownlee 2007). Autocrats who rule through parties "can more credibly guarantee a share of power and the spoils of office over the long run to those who invest in the existing institutions" (Magaloni 2008: 716). Parties thus "create incentives for long-term loyalty" (Brownlee 2007: 13). As long as the party is expected to remain in power, losers in short-term power struggles are likely to remain loyal in the expectation of access to spoils in future rounds (Geddes 1999: 129, 131; Brownlee 2007: 12-13). The result is "long-term cohesion…and the maintenance of political stability" (Brownlee 2007: 13). According to Geddes (2005: 6-7), even weak parties created from above by dictators create "vested interests" in regime survival through the distribution of patronage to party cadres. Where governing parties are absent, regime elites see fewer opportunities for political advancement from within and are thus more likely to seek power from outside the regime (Way 2002a, 2005; Brownlee 2007a; 13-14). Such elite defection is a major cause of authoritarian breakdown.[11]

Yet as Smith (2005) observes, not all party-based authoritarian regimes are alike.[12] Whereas some of them are highly durable, surviving for a half century or more (e.g., Cuba, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan), others prove ephemeral, surviving for less than a decade (e.g, Ghana under Nkrumah, Georgia under Shevardnadze). The recent theoretical literature on parties and authoritarianism offers little insight into this variation--largely because it understates the vast differences that exist among ruling parties themselves (Smith 2005). Indeed, much of this literature is based on the assumption that ruling parties are institutionalized patronage-based machines. In fact, however, ruling parties vary widely, both in terms of their organizational

[11] See Geddes (1999) and Brownlee (2005), as well as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986).

[12] Also Huntington (1970: 8-9) and Slater and Smith (2009).

strength and, crucially, their cohesion. As we argue below, this variation is critical to explaining authoritarian durability.

Dimensions of Party Strength: Scope and Cohesion

Party strength may be understood in terms of two dimensions: scope and cohesion (Levitsky and Way 2010).[13] Scope refers to the size of a party's infrastructure, or the degree to which it penetrates the national territory and society. Where scope is high, parties possess mass organizations that maintain a permanent and active presence across the national territory, down to the village, neighborhood level, and/or workplace level. For example, UMNO in Malaysia maintained 16,500 branch organizations, which allowed it to penetrate "every village in the country"[14] and assign a party agent to monitor every 10 households (Case 2001a: 52, 2001b: 37). Likewise, the KMT in Taiwan possessed a "huge party apparatus" (Tien and Chu 1998: 112) that "deeply penetrated the local society" (Rigger 2000: 134) and operated cells in schools, businesses, and "social groups at all levels" (Kau 1996: 289; Dickson 1996: 46);[15] Where scope is low, parties lack any real organization, membership, or activist base. Party operations are confined to major urban centers, the president's home region, and in some cases, the

[13]These dimensions are operationalized in the Appendix.

[14]*Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 24, 1999, p. 1.

[15]The CCM in Tanzania maintained a two million member mass organization and a massive network of 10 House Party Cells that "[made] it very easy for the party to reach everyone in the country" (Lucan Way, interview with Joseph Warioba, ex-Prime Minister of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, 22 November 2007). On CCM membership and 10 House Party Cells, see Barkan (1994: 16); Berg Schlosser and Siegler (1990: 81).

presidential palace.[16] In Peru, for example Alberto Fujimori's New Majority "had scarcely any organizational presence outside the national congress" (Roberts 2006: 95).[17]

Ruling parties also vary on the dimension of cohesion. We define party cohesion as leaders' ability to reliably and consistently secure the cooperation of partisan allies within the government, in the legislature, and at the local or regional level. Where cohesion is high, allied ministers, legislators, and governors routinely support the government, implement presidential directives, and vote the party line. Internal rebellion and defection are rare--even in the face of major crises or opposition challenges. And when elite defections occur, they attract few followers. In Nicaragua, for example, the Sandinista leadership did not experience a single public schism during the 1980s, despite a civil war and severe economic crisis. In Mexico, the PRI did not suffer a single major defection between 1952 and 1987, and legislative discipline was nearly 100 percent (Weldon 1997, 2004; Langston 2006). Where cohesion is low, parties are little more than loose coalitions of relatively autonomous actors, many of which derive their power and status from outside the party. Parties lack minimally stable mechanisms for distributing patronage or settling internal conflicts, and as a result, incumbents routinely confront insubordination, rebellion, or defection from within the cabinet, in the legislative bloc, and among regional bosses. Examples include the MMD in Zambia, whose first leadership succession triggered such massive defection that four major opposition candidates in the 2001

[16]In Malawi in the early 1990s, for example, the party structures of the ruling Malawi Congress Party were reported to be "virtually non-existent" outside of dictator Kamuza Banda's home region *(Africa Confidential*, October 22, 1993, p. 7.) Where scope is medium (e.g., KANU in Kenya, UNIP in Zambia), parties possess national structures, with offices in most of the country, but they are not mass organizations that penetrate or mobilize society in any significant way.

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presidential election were recent defectors from the ruling party (Burnell 2003); and ADEMA in Mali, which was so "hopelessly factionalized"[18] prior to the 2002 presidential election that many of its leading politicians supported opposition candidates or abandoned the ruling party entirely.

Variation along the dimensions of scope and cohesion is critical to explaining the diversity of outcomes among party-based authoritarian regimes. Where ruling parties are well-organized and cohesive (e.g., Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan), authoritarian regimes tend to be durable. Where they are not (e.g., Ghana under Nkrumah, Georgia under Shevardnadze), authoritarian regimes are often short-lived. The importance of organizational scope is relatively straightforward: mass party structures provide incumbents with tools to mobilize supporters, win or steal elections, and monitor and repress opponents.

Yet the key to authoritarian stability in party-based regimes is *cohesion*. Much of the literature assumes that ruling party cohesion is rooted in patronage and institutionalized opportunities for career advancement.[19] But patronage is a weak source of cohesion. Parties that are organized exclusively around patronage and career ambition may effectively discourage defection during normal times, while the party's hold on power is perceived as secure. However, such parties vulnerable to crisis, or any exogenous shock that threatens their capacity to deliver the goods. Thus, when economic crisis erodes incumbents' capacity to distribute patronage, or when the emergence of protest or a viable electoral opposition threatens incumbents' hold on power, patronage-based parties are prone to large-defection. Indeed, when such a crisis generates the belief that access to patronage is better secured via defection than by remaining loyal to the

[18] *Africa Confidential* 23 July 1999, p. 5; also *Africa Today* March 2002, p. 31.

[19] Again, see Geddes (1999, 2005); Brownlee (2007), and Magaloni (2008). Exceptions include Slater and Smith (2009); Hanson (2010); and Lebas (forthcoming)

governing party, it may trigger a bandwagoning effect in which politicians jump *en masse* to the opposition (Rasmussen 1969). As one defecting member of the ruling UNIP in Zambia put it, "only a stupid fly … follows a dead body to the grave."[20]

Such a bandwagoning process was seen in Senegal in the late 1990s. The long-ruling Socialist Party (PS) was a classic "party of barons," organized around patronage and clientelist ties to Sufi Muslim leaders (*marabouts*) who delivered rural votes.[21] Although single party rule was relatively stable in the initial post-colonial period, economic crisis and fiscal retrenchment in the 1989s and 1889s led to "patronage decompression," which undermined the PS' capacity to contain elite defection (Galvan 2001: 54, 59; also Boone 1990: 350-353). By the late 1990s, the party "could no longer hold its ranks together" (Galvan 2001: 54-55), and defections by top party barons and *marabouts* led directly to the Socialists' defeat in 2000.[22] Likewise, in Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze's Citizen's Union of Georgia (CUG) was a heterogeneous coalition of "uneasy bedfellows," held together via patronage.[23] Though dominant in the 1990s, while Shevardnadze was popular and opposition was weak, the CUG imploded in the early 2000s as public support eroded (Mitchell 2008b: 36-38). In 2000 and 2001, numerous CUG and government officials—including Justice Minister Mikheil Saakashvili and two successive Parliamentary Speakers—jumped into opposition. By late 2001, the CUG was "in shambles, torn apart by defecting factions" (Fairbanks 2004: 113). Barely a third of its parliamentary deputies remained in the party, and "Shevardnadze's top protégés were now leading many of the

[20]Quoted in Ihonvbere (1996: 70).

[21]See Behrman (1970); Villalón (1995); Boone (1992: 95-98); Beck (2001, 2008).

[22]See Beck (2001); Galvan (2001); Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002).

[23]Wheatley (2004); also Dragaze (1994: 183); Slider (1997: 164-165); Jones (1999); Wheatley (2005: chapter 5).

major opposition parties" (Mitchell 2008b: 38; also Wheatley 2005: 128). Within two years, the regime had collapsed.

Non-Material Sources of Cohesion: The Role of Violent Party Origins

Building on recent work by Slater and Smith (2009), Hanson (2010), and Lebas (forthcoming), we argue that the most effective sources of intra-party cohesion are *non-material*. Non-material sources of cohesion include ideology (Hanson 2010) and ethnicity (Enloe 1976), particularly contexts of ideological or ethnic polarization.[24] Perhaps the most important non-material source of cohesion, however is the bonds of solidarity that are forged during periods of violent conflict.[25]

Arguments linking ruling party strength to origins in struggle are, of course, not new. In his classic work on political development, Huntington argued that the most robust single party regimes were a "product of struggle and violence" (1970: 13). The strength of authoritarian parties, he argued, is rooted in the "duration and intensity of the struggle to acquire power or to consolidate power after taking over the government" (Huntington 1970: 14). Thus, "the more intense and prolonged the struggle for power…, the greater the political stability of the one party

[24] In Malaysia, for example, cohesion within UMNO was reinforced by strong ties to the Malay community (Enloe 1976; Zakaria 1985: 121). From its founding, UMNO was "intimately identified with the interests of a single ethnic community" (Enloe 1976: 67), and it viewed itself "first and foremost as a protector of the Malays" (Thirkill-White 2006: 424). Likewise, race served as a powerful source of cohesion in the Guyanese People's National Congress (PNC), which ruled Guyana from independence until 1992 (Premgas 1995).

[25]We score parties as being grounded in violent conflict only and as long as veterans of the conflict dominate the party leadership.

See Huntington (1968: 425: 1970: 14-17): Slater and Smith (2009) and LeBas (forthcoming).

system" (Huntington 1968: 424).[26] For Huntington, then, stable authoritarianism was most likely to emerge out of successful revolutions or "prolonged nationalist movements" against colonial rule (1968: 425). In a more recent analysis building on Huntington, Smith (2005) argues that strong opposition threats during a regime's foundational period create incentives for ruling party elites to build robust organizations. Both of these analyses focus on scope, or how intense conflict or struggle strengthens mass party organizations. For Huntington, violent struggle motivates leaders to "mobilize and organize the masses" (1970: 14); for Smith, it creates incentives for leaders to build extensive "party institutions to mobilize their own constituencies" (2005: 422).

However, in our view, violent origins are most consequential for party *cohesion*. To be effective, large party organizations must be reliable and disciplined. As we show below, ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were defeated not because they lacked extensive party structures but because those structures were decimated by defection and some cases turned *against* incumbent power. During periods of crisis, non-material cohesion inoculates regimes against elite defection that has been fatal to so many patronage-based parties.

Origins in violent conflict or struggle enhance cohesion in three ways. First, they generate strong ties of solidarity. Intense polarization and/or violent conflict enhance group solidarity, strengthening collective identities and affective ties (Lebas forthcoming: 50-56). Cadres who fought together in the bush, endured prison together, and/or have common friends or family members who died during the struggle are more likely to maintain long-term bonds of friendship, mutual trust, and loyalty—which can be critical to party discipline during periods of adversity.

[26] According to Huntington, many nationalist parties in Africa "came to power easily," and in the absence of violent conflict, failed to build strong parties (Huntington 1970: 14).

Violent conflict thus sharpens group boundaries by strengthening within-group ties and sharpening "we-them" distinctions between groups (Lebas forthcoming: 51-53). It helps parties to build "walls" around their organizations by raising the cost of defection (Lebas forthcoming: 54). In such a context, a politician's decision-making process departs from the patronage-seeking or career maximizing behaviour that is assumed in much of the literature. Cadres view party membership in affective or "moral" terms (Lebas forthcoming: 55), and choices regarding cooperation or defection are framed in terms of loyalty rather than a simple material calculus. Defection may be viewed as disloyalty and even treason. For many cadres, it may be literally "unthinkable."[27]

In many cases, affective ties are reinforced by shared ideology, which is frequently a by-product of revolutionary struggle (Huntington 1970: 13).[28] Ideology is be critical to party cohesion (Hanson 2010), for it unites activists around a set of shared beliefs and symbols provides a "higher cause" that legitimates their struggle. Thus, ideology allows parties to call upon activists to sacrifice and remain loyal even in the absence of an imminent material payoff.[29]

Second, successful revolutionary or liberation struggles tend to produce a generation of leaders (or in some cases, individual leaders) with extraordinary legitimacy and unquestioned authority, which they can use to unify the party and impose discipline during crises. In China, for example, the generation of the long march appears to have been critical in forging unified

[27] Polarization rooted in violent conflict may also deter defection by tying the base to the party. Strong party identities in the electorate make it less likely that voters will follow defecting politicians out of the party.

[28] In certain cases – as in contemporary Mozambique – differences in ideology may diminish while symbolic differences rooted in affective ties and diverging views of a country's history remain highly salient.

[29] As one Sandinista activist put it, "the party can send us wherever it wants and say 'be there tomorrow'" (Quoted in Gilbert (1988: 55)).

response to the 1989 pro-democracy protests. Available accounts suggest that the Communist Party leadership split over how to respond to the protests. Mark Thompson (2001) and Andrew Nathan (2001) argue that the survival of the revolutionary generation in the Party leadership was critical to the decision to crack down. A group of party "elders" drawn from the revolutionary period acted as a cohesive and self-confident "final court of appeals" (Nathan 2001: xvi). The elders possessed the authority to impose unity on the party and provided the Communist leadership with the cohesion and self-confidence needed to risk the high intensity repression of June 1989. As we shall see, liberation leaders—or *antigos combatentes*--played a similar role in maintaining ruling party cohesion in Mozambique; and although ZANU ex-combatants were more internally divided in Zimbabwe, they always closed ranks behind Robert Mugabe during periods of crisis.

Third, parties forged out of violent struggle establish strong ties to the coercive apparatus. Successful revolutionary or liberation parties often create state coercive structures from scratch. In such cases, security agencies tend to be closely linked to the party, commanded by trusted party members who fought in the liberation struggle, and infused with the ruling party's ideology—all of which enhances discipline. In post-revolutionary Nicaragua, for example, the security forces were "explicitly Sandinista" (Walker 1991: 81, Cajina 1997: 116-123). All top army officials were ex-guerrilla leaders and most remained active in the Sandinista leadership (Gilbert 1988: 63; Cajina 1997: 107). Thus,

> Sandinista ideological influence in the ranks of the army was total. The cohesion and *esprit de corps* of the [army]…were essentially political-partisan. The immense majority of officers were possessed by a genuine sense of mission that transcended the strictly military. They were defenders and guarantors of a revolutionary political

> project…marked by history and a destiny of conflict with the greatest power on earth (Cajina 1997: 125).

Finally, a history of participation in violent struggle often produces a generation of security officials with the stomach for violent repression. Combined with trust and close inter-personal ties that link the party leaders and security officials, this previous experience with violence increases the likelihood that the security forces will carry out orders to repress opposition.

Building on Huntington (1970) and Smith (2005), the stability of party-based authoritarian regimes hinges on the strength of ruling parties, and this strength is often rooted in parties' origins and ascent to power. Parties that emerge out of violent conflict are more likely to possess not only the organizational strength highlighted by Smith (2005) but also the internal *cohesion* necessary to survive serious crises (LeBas 2010). Ruling parties that consolidate power in the absence of violent struggle tend to be organized around patronage, which, though often an adequate source of cohesion during normal times, is often insufficient to prevent defection during crises.

Before moving on to the case analyses, three points are worth noting. First, cohesive party structures are generally inherited by rulers; rarely are they a product of an individual rulers' strategic choice.[30] Contra Lebas (forthcoming), we view the violent conflict that gives rise to cohesive party structures as a macro-structural condition over which individual party leaders have little control**.**[31] Second, revolutionary cohesion is hardly a guarantee of regime stability.[32]

[30]Here we disagree with scholars such as Geddes (2005) and Magaloni (2008), as well as Lebas (forthcoming), who presents polarization and conflict as an opposition party strategy.

[31] Thus, our analysis is more in line with historical institutionalist accounts of party and regime formation such as those of Huntington (1968, 1970), Shefter (1994), Smith (2005), and Slater (2010).

[32]See Slater and Smith (2009).

Although elite defection is a major cause of authoritarian breakdown (O´Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007), it is not the only one. Factors such as domestic opposition, economic performance, and external pressure weigh heavily as well. For example, highly cohesive ruling parties in Nicaragua and Guyana were defeated in early 1990s—despite virtually no elite defection— by a combination of economic crisis and intense international pressure. All things being equal, however, violent origins appear to significantly improve a ruling party's capacity to survive crises.

Finally, the regime-strengthening effect of a party's violent origins has a "best before" date. Violent struggle most effectively generates cohesion while the original revolutionary generation is alive. Subsequent generations are likely to lack sufficient legitimacy to impose unity in crisis and may lack the stomach to repress. Moreover, solidarity bonds and ideology are almost certain to weaken as parties institutionalize over time. The erosion of revolutionary cohesion was evident in late Soviet history. By the Brezhnev period, when the original revolutionary generation had died off, the Soviet regime had largely abandoned large-scale high intensity coercion, relying instead on low intensity measures such as firing, blacklisting, pre-emptive arrest, and occasional exile (Alexeyeva and Chalidze 1985). As a result, the generation of leaders in power in the late 1980s lacked the stomach to engage in the high intensity coercion that would have been necessary to put down opposition after 1988 (Beissinger 2002; Way 2009b). Moreover, the absence of a revolutionary generation equivalent to the Chinese elders arguably made it harder for the government to impose unity once the system had begun to disintegrate.

In sum, we argue that ruling parties that emerge out of violent conflict are better equipped than patronage-based parties to survive regime-threatening crises. In the sections that follow, we illustrate our argument though a comparative analysis of party-based authoritarian regimes in post-Cod War Africa: Kenya and Zambia, where patronage-based ruling parties collapsed in the face of economic and/or succession crises; and Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where ruling parties and regimes remained intact despite similar—and arguably deeper—crises.

Party Origins, Elite Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability in Post-Cold War Africa

This article explores the impact of ruling party origins on regime durability through a comparison of four competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya under KANU; Mozambique under Frelimo; Zambia under UNIP, and Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF. Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents (Levitsky and Way 2010). Such regimes are competitive, in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic, as the playing field is skewed in favor of incumbents. Competitive authoritarianism proliferated in post-Cold War Africa (van de Walle 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the West as the world's dominant military, economic, and ideological power, and unprecedented democracy promotion efforts by Western governments and international organizations raised the cost of outright dictatorship and created incentives to adopt formal democratic institutions (Levitsky and

Way 2010).[33] Yet the post-Cold War international environment did not necessarily bring democracy. In much of the world, Western democratizing pressure proved superficial (Joseph 1999a, 1999b). Donors focused mainly on the holding of elections while often ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties and a level playing field (Carothers 1999; Lawson 1999). The result, in many cases, was competitive authoritarianism.

Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe shared several characteristics at the dawn of the post-Cold War era. All four were poor (with per capita GDP below $1000) and predominantly rural countries with stable single party or dominant party regimes led by the party that led the country to independence (KANU in Kenya, Frelimo in Mozambique, UNIP in Zambia, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe).[34] All four ruling parties had extensive party structures and relatively stable patronage networks, and in 1990, all of them had been in power for at least a decade. Moreover, all four countries were or became competitive authoritarian in the early 1990s: Whereas Zimbabwe had maintained multiparty rule since 1980, Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia adopted multiparty rule between 1990 and 1992. Finally, all four regimes faced serious crises, marked by economic downturn, external democratizing pressure, and the rise of strong opposition challenges. Yet regime outcomes varied. Whereas UNIP and KANU suffered large-scale defection and fell from power (UNIP in 1991, KANU in 2002), Frelimo and ZANU remained intact and survived in power through 2010. We contend that these diverging outcomes can be traced to distinct party origins. In Kenya and Zambia, postcolonial ruling parties emerged at roughly the same time that Great Britain began to disengage from its colonial control over

[33] The transformation was particularly striking in sub-Saharan Africa, where the number of *de jure* single party regimes fell from 29 in 1989 to zero in 1994 (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 8).

[34] All four cases are coded as "single party" by Geddes (2003: 227-232).

Africa in the early 1960s. Thus, both KANU and UNIP were able to gain power without serious violent struggle; and consequently, they consolidated into patronage-based machines. By contrast, Frelimo and ZANU came to power only after years of armed struggle against colonial or settler rule, which gave rise to cohesive party structures capable with a greater capacity to survive crises.

Zambia

Zambia is a case of a ruling patronage-based party that collapsed quickly in the face of economic crisis and a strong opposition challenge. The United National Independent Party (UNIP), which had ruled Zambia since independence, was a patronage-based machine without roots in violent struggle. The single party regime led by founding President Kenneth Kaunda was relatively stable during the Cold War period, but in the face of a severe fiscal crisis and the rise of a robust labor-based opposition, the regime imploded. Large-scale defection to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) crippled the ruling party and led to Kaunda's overwhelming defeat in the 1991 presidential election.

Party Origins and Ascent to Power

Although UNIP led Zambia to independence, it was not forged out of violent struggle. UNIP was founded in 1958-1959 when Kenneth Kaunda and other African leaders split from the moderate African National Congress (ANC) in order to adopt a hardline anti-colonial position and build a "well-organized and highly disciplined national movement" (Mulford 1967: 74; Scott

1976: 47-8). Due to the growing popularity of African nationalism and the "high priority given to party organization by UNIP's leaders" (Mulford 1967:146), UNIP experienced "rapid growth" in key areas of the country (Mulford 1967: 151, 161-2), and by late 1960, it had emerged as the dominant African party in Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia) (Mulford 1967: 159, 174: Scott 1976: 55).

UNIP's ascent to power was relatively easy. Zambian independence was negotiated and, with a few minor exceptions,[35] non-violent. Given Britain's stated willingness (beginning in 1959-60)[36] to grant independence, and with Britain acting as a powerful moderating influence on white leaders in Northern Rhodesia, Kaunda had no need to organize an armed rebellion. Instead, he focused on negotiating independence and mobilizing broad based support for UNIP in semi-free elections in 1962 and 1964 (Mulford 1967; Scott 1976). As a result, Zambian independence was achieved "without serious economic or political dislocation" (Mulford 1967: 338).

UNIP thus ascended to power without having developed an ideologically committed cadre or strong bonds of internal solidarity. Rather, the party emerged in the post-colonial period as a "coalition of factional interests" (Tordoff 1988: 9).[37] In the absence of alternative sources of cohesion, Kaunda relied heavily on patronage, using government resources to create a

[35] These included sporadic factional battles with the ANC and a sometimes violent campaign of civil disobedience in the summer of 1961 against proposed constitutional changes (Mulford 1967: 151, 198-204, 320). The UNIP leadership's role in the 1961 violence is not clear (Mulford 1967: 201).

[36] In 1959, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan successfully sidelined pro-colonial elements within the Conservative Party and appointed Ian Macleod, a proponent of rapid decolonization, as colonial secretary (see Spruyt 2005: 137-9).

[37]Also Ihonvbere (1996: 51); Baylies and Szeftel (1992: 78); Momba (2003: 39).

"maximum coalition" that encompassed as wide a range of ethnic, regional, and ideological groups as possible (Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 78; Mwanakatwe 1994: 53; von Donge 1995b: 196). Cohesion within UNIP was thus relatively low from the outset, as "intense factionalism" quickly became a "dominant feature of party affairs" (Scott 1976: 12).[38] In 1967, distributional conflicts among ethno-regional leaders led to open rebellion within the leadership that "almost shattered UNIP" (Pettman 1974: 233), and in 1971, longtime UNIP stalwart Simon Kapwepe left the party to form the United Progressive Party (UPP) (Pettman 1974: 234; Larmer 2008: 103-4). Fearing a threat from the new party, Kaunda banned the UPP and established *de jure* single party rule in 1973 (Pettman 1974; Larmer 2008).

UNIP also failed to build a robust mass organization along the lines of ZANU in Zimbabwe (LeBas forthcoming: 179). Although it was well-organized in the Copperbelt and a few other provinces, UNIP's territorial structure was always uneven (Mulford 1967: 327: LeBas forthcoming: 179). Local party structures "disintegrated" in the 1970s after the imposition of single party rule,[39] and by 1980, party membership had fallen to less than 8 percent of the population (LeBas forthcoming: 179).

Crisis and Regime Response

[38] UNIP was "an uneasy nationalist coalition whose political, economic, and ethno-regional divisions were expressed as both overt schisms and covert conflicts" (Larmer 2008: 100).

[39] No longer needed to win elections, UNIP was deprived of control over local employment opportunities and branch and constituency officials ceased to be paid positions (Tordoff 1988: 24-25).

Like others in the region, the Kaunda government fell into crisis in the late 1980s amid a steep economic decline (Bratton 1992; Ihonvbere 2003b). GDP contracted by nearly 20 percent between 1981 and 1986, and by the mid-1980s, living standards had fallen to 1967 levels (LeBas forthcoming: 175). Bankrupt and facing rising social protest, the government grew dependent on international financial institutions (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 104), and in 1990, internationally-sponsored structural adjustment triggered massive urban riots (Bratton 1992: 85-86). Protest quickly evolved into a democracy movement, and in July 1990, civil society groups, led by the Zambian Central Trade Union (ZCTU), formed the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) (Bratton 1992; LeBas forthcoming: 182-194, 255). The emergence of opposition triggered a "bandwagon effect,"[40] and "cascade" of defections[41], as numerous high ranking government officials, national party leaders, MPs, and local politicians jumped to the MMD.[42]

Unlike KANU and Frelimo, UNIP was unable to survive the initial transition to multiparty rule. Lacking resources, UNIP's patronage machine "ran out of fuel."[43] Elite defection "triggered a disintegration of UNIP party structures," and UNIP organizations across the country "experienced a mass exodus of officials during the months preceding the elections" (LeBas forthcoming: 256-257). These defections strengthened the opposition, as ruling party politicians brought their experience, constituencies, and financial resources to the MMD (Ihonvbere 1996:

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[40] Ihonvbere (1997: 69)

[41] Lebas (forthcoming: 256-258)

[42] Overall, 20 MMD candidates in 1991 were former or sitting UNIP deputies (Baylies and Szeftel 1992: 83). Also van Donge (1995b: 199), Ihonvbere (1997: 69-70).

[43]Bratton (1994: 123–4); see also Joseph (1992: 200).

65, 2003b: 56-59). In this context, UNIP was unable to take advantage a playing field that remained skewed in its favour.[44] MMD candidate Frederick Chiluba overwhelmingly defeated Kaunda in the 1991 election, putting an end to UNIP rule.

In sum, Zambia is a striking case of how quickly and thoroughly patronage based ruling parties may unravel in the context of crisis. When UNIP's ability to deliver patronage eroded and a viable opposition emerged, politicians defected from the once-dominant party in droves, bringing a quick end to two decades of single party rule.

Kenya

Kenya is a case of an established patronage-based party that suffered large-scale defection and, eventually, defeat, in the post-Cold War period. The ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) faced an initial crisis in 1991-92, when the introduction of multiparty rule and the emergence of a viable opposition triggered the defection of numerous party barons. Although President Daniel arap Moi managed to win re-election in 1992 and 1997, his retirement and the subsequent succession struggle triggered a massive wave of defections that contributed directly to KANU's defeat in 2002.

Party Origins and Ascent to Power

[44] A state of emergency—which restricted a range of civil liberties—was in effect for much of the 1991 campaign. In addition, UNIP controlled the electoral authorities and the electronic media remained state-owned and biased. See Mwanakatwe (1994: 230-231); Panter-Brick (1994: 241); Ihonvbere (1996: 120).

KANU, which ruled Kenya from independence until 2002, was not founded in violent struggle. Kenya, of course, was host to a large scale rebellion: the 1952-56 Mau Mau uprising.[45] However, the Mau Mau was defeated by the British in 1956—seven years before independence. Thus, although the uprising (and the colonial response to it) weakened colonial rule, the Mau Mau neither defeated the British nor ascended to power. Moreover, notwithstanding British claims that Jomo Kenyatta and the Kenya African Union (KAU) were behind the Mau Mau (Miller and Yeager 1994: 59-60), ties between the Kikuyu radicals and the Kenyatta and the politicians who led the transition to independence in 1963 were weak (Widner 1992: 51-53). Kenyan independence was negotiated by moderate and conservative Kenyan elites, and the 1963 transition was a relatively smooth, elite-led affair transfer of power that involved little mass mobilization or violent conflict (c.f. Ogot 1995). And crucially, while a few local branches of KANU were headed by Mau Mau veterans (Branch 2009: 185-7), the party was founded and led by moderates—like Kenyatta—with few ties to the Mau Mau (Widner 1992: 51-3; Branch 2009: 181). "Former Mau Mau leaders ... played relatively part in Kenyan politics" after 1963 (Widner 1992: 149) and loyalist Kenyans, who had helped to suppress the rebellion, permeated the post-colonial state (Branch 2009: 149). As Ogot put it, "Mau Mau – a liberation movement, unlike Frelimo or the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) – never transformed itself into a political party, thus leaving room for ... national party organizations, such as KANU and KADU, which were never liberation movements, to emerge" (1995: 51).

KANU was thus not forged out of violent conflict. Created in 1960, after negotiations with the British had begun, it was a coalition of diverse ethnic and ideological groups in which radical

[45]Over the course of four years, the civil war cost approximately 25,000 lives (Branch 2009: 5). For recent detailed analyses of the Mau Mau rebellion, see Anderson (2005); Elkins (2005); Branch (2009).

Kikuyu coexisted with moderates, former British loyalists, and other ethnic elites.[46] Indeed, conservative elements quickly gained pre-eminence, marginalizing radicals with ties to the Mau Mau—a tendency that was reinforced by the 1964 merger with the conservative (and British-backed) Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) (Slater and Smith 2009: 26; OTHER CITES!). Rather than a liberation party, then, KANU was a "loose conglomeration of local notables" (Hyden 1994: 90) that relied on "patronage—and patronage alone—to hold together a fractious coalition" (Slater and Smith 2009: 23).[47] KANU's organizational structure was "strikingly weak" (Hadenius 1994: 3; also). Having never engaged in mass mobilization prior to independence, the party did not develop a large grassroots organization or activist base (Widner 1992a). Rather, it was a "moribund organization" (Throup 1993: 380) that was "left to wither" after independence (Miller and Yeager 1994: 43).[48] By the late 1960s, KANU was "functionally dead," with just 3000 members (Decalo 1998: 208). Moi, who succeeded Kenyatta in 1978, strengthened and centralized the party organization (Widner 1992a; Throup and Hornsby 1998: 36-38). He also purged the party of many of its Kikuyu barons and replaced them with ethnic allies.[49] Despite this restructuring, however, KANU remained a thoroughly patronage-based organization (Decalo 1998: 247; Ajulu 2001: 202: Clinkenbeard 2004: 227, 251).

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[46]See Beinen (178: 82-84); Barkan (1992: 170); Widner (1992a); Throup and Hornsby (1998); Decalo (1998: 195, 213); Slater and Smith (2009: 23-26).

[47]Likewise, Beinin (1978: 82-83) describes KANU as a "party of notables." Also Barkan (1992: 170, 1994: 16); Widner (1992: 56-57, 72); Decalo (1998: 213); Throup and Hornsby (1998: 45).

[48] Widner describes KANU as a "weak debating society" in the 1960s (1992a: 72). According to Miller and Yeager, the party's "local offices were vacated and padlocked" (1994: 43). Kenyatta governed at the margins of the party, relying instead on state institutions and patronage networks (Widner 1992a; Throup and Hornsby 1998: 10, 17).

[49]See Barkan (1993: 88); Throup (1993: 385-387); Ng'ethe (1998: 19).

Crisis and Regime Response

As elsewhere in the region, Kenya's single party regime fell into crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s. On the one hand, single party rule came under pressure with the end of the Cold War. Although the Moi government had been a U.S. ally during the Cold War, it became a target of Western conditionality after 1989 (Schmitz 1999: 51-56; Clinkenbeard 2004: 254-258). Moi also faced growing domestic opposition. Kenyan opposition forces were stronger than elsewhere in the region, as decades of intra-party electoral competition gave rise to a class of politicians with independent support bases and Kenya's open economy permitted the rise of a robust private sector and civil society.[50] In 1990, amid growing calls for multipartyism from churches and other civic groups, ex-KANU barons Charles Rubia and Kenneth Matiba joined opposition leader Oginga Odinga to launch the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 57-79). Moi's attempts to crack down on the emerging democracy movement—for example, the bloody repression of the July 1990 Saba Saba protests (Decalo 1998: 256-258)—triggered Western sanctions (Schmitz 1999). In November 1991, donors suspended $350 million in assistance and tied future aid to political reform (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 84). Isolated, Moi quickly legalized opposition and called multiparty elections for 1992 (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 87-88).

The transition to multiparty rule generated a crisis within KANU. Due to Moi's unpopularity, as well as the emergence of FORD as a serious electoral threat,[51] "all predictions were that [KANU] would lose" multiparty elections (Holmquist and Ford 1997: 7). In this

[50] Barkan (1992: 175-176, 1994: 18-19); Widner (1992a: 35-37, 1994); House-Midamba (1996: 292-293).

[51] See Tostensen et al. (1998: 5). In January 1992, FORD mobilized more than 100,000 people in a rally (Miller and Yeager 1994: 111; Throup and Hornsby 1998: 100).

context, KANU politicians began to defect *en masse* (Throup and Hornbsy 1998: 93-96). Because the ruling party was held together only by patronage, the prospect of an electoral defeat triggered a "massive political re-alignment…as numerous former KANU stalwarts deserted to the opposition" (Decalo 1998: 260). Late 1991 and early 1992 thus saw a "continuous flow of present and former MPs, local KANU officials and other prominent Kenyans into the opposition parties" (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 96). It was KANU´s "darkest hour. No one knew who was loyal or who was about to defect to the opposition" (Throup and Hornsby 1998: 105).

Repression, electoral manipulation, and a debilitating opposition schism allowed Moi and KANU to survive the 1992 election.[52] Moi won narrowly, with 36 percent of the vote, and although KANU won only 30 percent of the legislative vote, gerrymandering and fraud helped it secure a parliamentary majority (Barkan 1998: 213). Following the election, numerous opposition MPs defected back to KANU, demonstrating the purely patronage-based logic of the governing coalition (Chege 1996: 354). Opposition forces remained divided in 1997, and KANU again "cheated, bribed, intimidated and finally rigged its way to [victory]."[53]

The regime weakened considerably after 1997, however. Periodic aid freezes exerted "tremendous pressure" on the government, denying it "resources and legitimacy" (Clinkenbeard 2004: 216-322, 343), and as the economy stagnated, KANU's public support eroded (Throup 2001: 2). KANU discipline eroded, and KANU MPs grew increasingly independent (Kibwana

[52]On state-sponsored violence during the 1992 election , see Kirschke (2000); Klopp (2001); and Brown (2003). On opposition division, see Oyugi (1997) and Jonyo (2002: 96-97). On unfair conditions in the election, see Ajulu (1998: 275-277); Barkan (1993); Geisler (1993): and Hornsby and Throup (1998: 244-246, 454-462).

[53]Hornsby (2001: 291). The opposition faced police harassment (Kagwanja 2001: 85-87), a biased electoral commission (Aywa and Grignon 2001), and an electronic media "blackout" (Omukada 2002: 81-84). Moi won with 41 percent of the vote, and fraud allowed KANU to claim a slim parliamentary majority (Rutten 2000).

2002: 275-276; Barkan 2003: 2-3). But the real crisis hit in June 2002, when Moi—abandoning efforts to circumvent presidential term limits (Ajulu 2001: 206)—announced his retirement. The announcement "fundamentally transformed" the political landscape (Ndegwa 2003: 153). The specter of Moi's succession "dissipated his patronage-bound support" and threw KANU into disarray as party barons scrambled to secure the presidential nomination (Ndegwa 2003: 150; also Holmquist and Ford 1998: 230). After Moi chose Uhuru Kenyatta, the inexperienced son of Jomo Kenyatta, as the ruling party's presidential candidate, KANU imploded, as leading party barons such as Vice President George Saitoti, KANU General Secretary Raila Odinga, former General Secretary, Joseph Kamotho, and Kalonzo Musyoka abandoned the party and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[54] In October 2002, the LDP joined forces with an existing opposition coalition to form the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which backed the presidential candidacy of Mwai Kibaki. In the face of a united opposition, KANU members "began to defect to the new party in droves," and by 2002, at least half of the 1990s-era KANU elite had joined the NARC (Brown 2004: 331).

The defections "crippled KANU" (Brown 2004: 331), leaving it without tools to win or steal the 2002 election. For one, the defectors delivered much of the electorate to NARC (Ajulu 2001:200-201). The departure of Odinga and other ethno-regional barons cost KANU much of the Luo, Luhya, and Kamba vote "in one fell swoop" (Ajulu 2003:14). The ex-KANU barons also delivered vast financial and organizational resources to the opposition (Brown 203: 333; Odhiambo-Mbai 2003: 80, 88). Indeed, by the time of the election, NARC's mobilizational capacity exceeded that of KANU (Anderson 2003: 333), which helped to ensure a relatively

[54]See Ajulu (2003: 8); Kanyinga (2003: 118-119); Odhiambo-Mbai (2003: 72-80); Brown (2004: 331-333).

clean election.[55] Finally, the defections crippled KANU's machinery of repression and fraud. Because several KANU defectors controlled militias that had carried out state-sponsored "ethnic conflict" in the 1990s, KANU effectively lost its monopoly on violence (Klopp 2001: 490-491, Brown 2004: 333). Moreover, in the face of an uncertain outcome, state officials were reluctant to engage in rigging and abuse (Ajulu 2003: 5-6; Throup 2003a: 4). Given Moi's lame duck status and KANU's implosion, "there was little reason for officials and politicians to indulge in mischief or chicanery on KANU's or Kenyatta's behalf. Instead, everyone wanted to keep open as many options as possible" (Ndegwa 153-154). Thus, "KANU did bribe; it did rig; it did intimidate voters; but in a spasmodic, half-hearted manner."[56] KANU lost the election in a landslide, ending nearly four decades of KANU rule.

In sum, although KANU (narrowly) survived multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997, the succession crises generated by Moi's retirement triggered a fatal string of defections. Although opposition unity was widely viewed as critical to the 2002 transition,[57] the defections triggered by KANU's succession crisis were "probably the single most important" set of factors shaping the transition (Ndegwa 2003: 150).[58] Thus, although KANU's patronage-based machine proved relatively robust during "normal times," it lacked the cohesion to survive a succession crisis.

Zimbabwe

[55]Anderson (2003: 333). Because NARC was able to monitor results at the precinct level, the party "knew it had won hours before the national radio broadcast theresults….There was simply no opportunity for anyone to 'retool' the count" (Ndegwa 2003: 154).
[56] Throup (2003a: 4)

[57]See Odhiambo-Mbai (2003: 57); Hulterstrom (2004); Howard and Roessler (2006).

[58]Also see Throup (2003b: 2) and Brown (2004: 331).

Conditions for democratization in Zimbabwe were relatively favorable.[59] In 1990, Zimbabwe was the wealthiest and most literate of the four countries examined in this paper. Moreover, it possessed a history of electoral competition and judicial independence, a relatively strong civil society, and beginning in the late 1990s, a well-organized and unified opposition. Nevertheless, the regime remained stable and competitive—despite a deep economic crisis—through 2010. Although this outcome is often attributed to President Robert Mugabe's autocratic leadership, it was also facilitated by the organizational tools that Mugabe had at his disposal, particularly an effective coercive apparatus and a cohesive ruling party.

Party Origins and Ascent to Power

The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was forged out of an armed liberation movement. Created in 1963, it launched an insurgency—via its armed wing, ZANLA—in 1966. The guerrilla war began in earnest in 1972, plunging Rhodesia into civil war that would ultimately cost 30,000 lives (Du Doit 1995: 103-107; Blair 2002: 10). ZNU/ZANLA confronted "a remarkably efficient and brutal state" (Herbst 2000: 17), with a powerful security apparatus (Bowman 1973: 145-154; Du Toit 1995: 108-109). The counterinsurgency transformed the coercive apparatus into "a Leviathan branch" (Weitzer 1990: 82), with vast surveillance capacity and "formidable" military power (Evans 1992: 232-233).[60] Yet ZANU developed a powerful organization, with 30,000-40,000 troops and networks of village-based Peoples Committees that

[59] In the 1980s, Zimbabwe was one of the wealthiest countries in Africa, with a literacy rate of nearly 80 percent (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 8, xv).

[60] Also Weitzer (1990: 145-146); Ellert (1995).

penetrated most of the countryside.[61] The guerrillas weakened the Rhodesian state (Du Toit 1995: 109), and although they had not achieved a military victory by 1979 peace accords, they "probably could have won" had the war continued (Herbst 1990: 46).

ZANU's strength as a guerrilla movement allowed it to quick build a powerful party structure. ZANLA's guerrilla networks gave the party a "stronger presence in rural areas than most African parties had at independence" (Herbst 1990: 34). Building on these networks (Kriger 1991: 213-215), ZANU developed "nation-wide organizational structure…from the village up to the national level" (Nordlund 1996: 148; Nkiwane 1998: 105-106). By the early 1980s, ZANU had party structures "at cell, branch, district, and province levels" (Nordlund 1996: 148).

The ZANU leadership was dominated by ex-guerrilla leaders who spent years together in the bush or in prison (Stoneman and Cliffe 1989: 35, Sithole 1999: 73; Meredith 2002: 34). This remained the case throughout the 1980s and 1990s;[62] indeed, in 2000, the ZANU politburo was still "dominated by Mugabe's lieutenants from the liberation struggle of the 1970s."[63] Marked by a "commandist" political culture inherited from the guerrilla war (Nordlund 1996: 287, 305; Sithole and Makumbe 1997: 134), ZANU demonstrated high levels of cohesion (Sithole 1988: 242; Herbst 1990: 239; Sithole and Makumbe 1997: 123). Although the party was "riddled with factions,"[64] Mugabe—who became ZANU's dominant leader after his release from prison in 1974 (Meredith 2002: 37)—served as a powerful unifying force. Imprisoned for 11 years,

[61]See Stoneman and Cliffe (1989; 25-26, 79); Herbst (1990: 34); Kriger (2003c: 24).

[62]See *Africa Confidential*, February 17, 1995, p. 4; April 15, 1995, p. 6; November 10, 2000, p. 1.

[63]*Africa Confidential*, November 10, 2000, p. 1.

[64]*Africa Confidential*, April 15, 1995, p. 5.

Mugabe became a national liberation hero with extraordinary legitimacy; within ZANU, his word "was virtually law" (Chikuhwa 2004: 140).

ZANU also established a firm grip over the coercive apparatus. ZANU and the security forces were linked by "an umbilical cord, formed during the anti-colonial war."[65] The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) "evolved out of a national struggle…in which the distinction between politicians and soldiers…was blurred" (Alao 1995: 115). Led by a generation of ex-guerrilla commanders generation of leaders who shared the "bush life" together in the 1970s (Alao 1995: 115-6), the ZNA was "highly partisan" and conceived of itself "as a praetorian guard deeply loyal to Mugabe" (International Crisis Group 2005: 12).[66] Army commanders were drawn "primarily from the ranks of ex-guerrillas who fought against the settler regime," and the security agencies were led by "war hardened" ex-combatants (Weitzer 1990: 142, 143; also Alao 1995: 112-116). Indeed, throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, Zimbabwe's main security forces, including the army (Solomon Mujuru, Vitalis Zvinavashe), the police force (Augustine Chihuri), the Central Intelligence Organization (Emmerson Mnanagagwa, Sidney Sekerimaya), and the notorious Fifth Brigade (Perence Shiri), were headed by ex-ZANLA combatants with close ties to ZANU and Mugabe.[67] The security forces were highly disciplined, surviving "a number of testing situations without fracturing."[68]

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[65] *Africa Confidential*, May 30, 2003, p. 5. Also Evans (1992: 247-248) and Alao (1995).

[66] Although the army hierarchy initially included ex-Rhodesian army officials and commanders from the rival ZIPRA guerrilla army, a series of purges in the early 1980s gave ZANU "undisputed mastery" over the security forces (Evans 1992: 239, MacBruce 1992: 212-213). By 1983 only ZANU-affiliated officials remained in the army command (Weitzer 1984b: 113-114; Seegers 1986: 151; Chitiyo and Rupiya 2005: 340-341).

[67] See Evans (1992; 241); MacBruce (1992: 214); Hatchard (1993: 30-31); Kriger (2000: 446); *Africa Today*, November 2000, p. 22; *Africa Confidential*, November 19, 2000, p. 2 and June 15, 2001, p. 2.

[68] Evans (1992: 248); Kriger (2003c: 199). According to Chitiyo and Rupiyo, the liberation struggle explains "the general absence of coups and military indiscipline in Zimbabwe" (2005: 350).

Crisis and Regime Response

Unlike ruling parties in Kenya, Mozambique, and Zambia, ZANU did not face a serious challenge in the immediate post-Cold War period. Upon winning the 1980 election, ZANU violently repressed the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and appeared to be headed toward single-party rule (Nordlund 1996: 146-154). Although the government abandoned plans for formal single-party rule in 1990 in the face of domestic and international opposition (Sachikoyne 1991; Nordlund 1996: 161-172), it remained a "de facto one-party state" for much of the 1990s (Nordlund 1996: 180). Taking advantage of vast resource and media advantages and facing a weak and disorganized opposition (Sylvester 1995), Mugabe was re-elected in 1990 with nearly 80 percent of the vote. In 1996, Mugabe faced two "two erratic, exhausted dinosaurs" and won with more than 90 percent of the vote (Blair 2002: 38).[69] Unlike KANU and UNIP, ZANU suffered "virtually no defections" in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[70]

The first serious challenge to ZANU rule emerged in the late 1990s, as economic stagnation and an unpopular war in the Congo generated public discontent and rising protest (Saunders 2007: 178-183). Civic activity increased markedly, and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) emerged as a potent force, spearheading a wave of strikes and protest in 1997 and 1998 (Alexander 2000; Saunders 2001). The ZCTU joined with church and civic groups to form the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a broad-based movement for

[69]The election took place on a "grossly uneven" playing field, which led several candidates to boycott the race (M and C 2000: 288-90).

[70] Nordlund (1996: 287); also Makumbe and Compagnon (2000: 41)

constitutional reform (Raftopoulos 2000: 39-41), and in 1999, NCA and ZCTU leaders created the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Led by unionist Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC united the opposition and built a robust national organization (Alexander 2000; Lebas forthcoming).

ZANU's electoral vulnerability was made manifest in early 2000, when the government drew up a new constitution and put it up to a referendum (Cheater 2001). The MDC opposed the reform, and despite the government's virtual monopoly over the media and finance,[71] the proposal was soundly defeated. The defeat "shook ZANU-PF to the core" (Meredith 2002: 165-166). With the economy in decline and legislative (2000) and presidential (2002) elections approaching, the party faced a "real possibility of losing power" (Makumbe 2002: 89). Indeed, surveys suggested that Mugabe would lose a presidential election (Compagnon 2000: 449).

Yet ZANU suffered no significant defections in the aftermath of the referendum defeat.[72] Indeed, despite considerable disaffection and conflict within the party leadership,[73] ZANU closed ranks around Mugabe. With the party and the security forces solidly behind him, Mugabe responded to the opposition challenge with repression. Thus, in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary election, the government launched a massive land reform, accompanied by a wave of violent, state-sponsored land invasions (Kriger 2000b: 446, 2003c: 197; Meredith 2002: 167-169). Government-backed war veterans "terrorized, raped, intimidated and killed alleged supporters of the MDC" (Laakso 2002b: 44). The land invasions become a "frontal assault" on

[71]The government's advantages were such that "to call [the] referendum a David and Goliath contest does not go nearly far enough. It was a fight between an elephant and a mouse" (Blair 2002: 53-54).

[72]See *Africa Confidential*, December 20, 2002, p. 1.

[73]See Compagnon (2000: 451); Meredith (2002: 166); also *Africa Confidential*, March 17, 2000, p. 1.

the MDC, “effectively cordoning off large areas of the rural constituency from opposition politicians” (Raftopolous 2001: 17). During the election campaign, MDC supporters were routinely attacked by war veterans and ZANU “youth brigades.”[74] After securing a narrow victory in the 2000 parliamentary election (with 48 percent of the vote and 62 of 120 contested seats), ZANU unleashed another wave of repression in order to send a “clear message” about what would occur in the event of opposition protest (Raftopoulos 2001: 23). Indeed, a late 2000 mass action campaign, inspired by the fall of Milošević in Serbia, was aborted after police mobilization made it clear that the “the risk of being gunned down” was far greater than in Serbia.[75]

The 2000 crackdown triggered a harsh international response, including U.S. sanctions (Laakso 2002b: 449-456). With the economy deteriorating rapidly, Mugabe faced a major challenge in the 2002 presidential election. Surveys showed MDC candidate Morgan Tsvangirai with a large lead,[76] and MDC leaders believed that the “enormous groundswell of anti-Mugabe sentiment…would translate into an election deluge that would submerge all attempts at electoral fraud” (Raftopoulos 2002: 418; also Blair 2003: 254). Yet, despite growing rank-and-file disaffection,[77] ZANU and the security forces “rallied round Mugabe and his increasingly radical

[74]International Crisis Group (2000); NDI (2000); Stiff (2000: 303, 377, 404-406); Meredith (2002: 173-180). Overall, human rights groups reported 37 deaths and 5000 incidents of political violence (Blair 2002: 158; Meredith 2002: 183).

[75]*Africa Today*, November 2000, p. 23-25; also Raftopoulos (2001: 23) and Blair (2002: 193-196).

[76]See Hill (2003: 160); *Africa Confidential*, August 10, 2001, p. 4; *Africa Today*, January 2002, p. 15.

[77]*Africa Today*, December 2000, p. 20-22; February 2001, p. 29; *Africa Report*, January 2001, p. 25.

policies," such that "many formerly moderate ruling party leaders [were] no longer distinguishable from the rest."[78]

Internal cohesion allowed Mugabe to steal the 2002 election through violence and rigging. Prior to the 2002 campaign, the government clamped down on media and opposition, forcing all journalists and media outlets to register with the government (Chikuhwa 2004: 122-123), requiring police permits for all political gatherings, and banning speech that provoked "feelings of hostility" toward the president (Human Rights Watch 2003a: 2, 7). Moreover, paramilitary forces known as "Green Bombers" manned roadblocks in the countryside, broke up opposition rallies, and abducted and tortured hundreds of MDC supporters (Blair 2003: 245-249, Chan 2003: 196-198). Late in the campaign, Tsvangirai was arrested and charged with plotting to kill Mugabe. On election eve, the government reduced the number of polling places in Harare and other MDC strongholds, preventing at least 350,000 people from voting.[79] In this context, Mugabe "won" with 56 percent of the vote.

The 2002 election was rejected by "virtually the entire Western world" (Hill 2003: 182); international sanctions were tightened, and the US and other Western powers refused to accept Mugabe as Zimbabwe's legitimately elected president (Makumbe 2002: 99). Yet ZANU and the security forces held together, and post-election protest plans fizzled in the face of repression (Raftopoulos 2002: 423-424). Militias "ranged the countryside assaulting known and suspected MDC supporters" (Makumbe 2002: 99), riot police "invaded campuses…beating students to a

[78] *Africa Today*, April-May 2002, p. 21. Also Kriger (2003c: 199) and Bauer and Taylor (2005: 200).

[79] *Africa Today*, March-April 2002, p. 24; Makumbe (2002: 97); Blair (2003: 258); Hill (2003: 180).

pulp," and "the dreaded Central Intelligence Organization [was] everywhere."[80] In this context, an opposition-led stayaway failed, and later efforts to "kick start mass action" were "met with instant arrest and torture in prison."[81] In mid-2003, the MDC launched a "final push" aimed at toppling the government,[82] but large-scale arrests, heavy deployment of riot police, and armed roadblocks on all roads to Harare defused the protest (LeBas 2006: 420).[83]

In sum, the Mugabe government survived the 2000 and 2002 elections (despite a deepening economic crisis and a potent opposition challenge), using large-scale violence to deter post-election protest. Crucially, the ruling party avoided the kind of elite defection seen in Kenya and Zambia. Indeed, as Africa Confidential observed, "In 22 years of independence, no more than a handful of [ZANU] politicians have defected."[84]

After 2002, Zimbabwe fell into a profound crisis. Internationally isolated, the country suffered an "economic collapse of an almost unprecedented scale" (Moss 2007: 143). GDP contracted by 60 percent between 2000 and 2006, and the country plunged into (Moss 2007: 134). Hunger became widespread, and the basic capacities of the state eroded (Moss 2007). In this context, support for ZANU evaporated even in its rural strongholds (Human Rights Watch 2008b). Yet ZANU remained intact,[85] and the coercive apparatus remained disciplined.[86]

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[80] *Africa Today*, February 2003, p. 27.

[81]*Africa Today*, April-May 2002, p. 25 and April 2003, p. 21.

[82]*Africa Confidential*, May 30, 2003, p. 3; June 13, 2003, p. 1; July 25, 2003, p. 3; LeBas (2006: 419-420).

[83] By late 2003, MDC leaders admitted that they "had tried but been incapable of organizing a mass action" (Lebas 2006: 433).

[84] *Africa Confidential*, December 20, 2002, p. 1.

[85]*Africa Today*, April-May 2002, p. 21; also International Crisis Group (2005: 10-12); LeBas (2006: 431).

Security officials—most of them ex-liberation fighters—gained ascendence in the upper echelons of the government (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006), and repression intensified. The government treated the MDC "as if it were a banned organization," arresting dozens of its MPs,[87] and in 2005, it undertook Operation "Drive out Rubbish," a violent sweep of informal traders—aimed at "cleansing" MDC urban strongholds—that displaced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes.[88]

Despite the worst economic crisis in the world (inflation reached 231 million percent in 2008), ZANU managed to steal yet another election in 2008. Notwithstanding his advancing age and apparent unpopularity, Mugabe stood for re-election in 2008. Although ZANU remained factionalized (International Crisis Group 2005), the move triggered only one significant defection: ex-Finance Minister Simba Makoni, who launched an independent presidential bid. Oddly, conditions were less repressive than in 2002: candidates were able to campaign throughout the country, which permitted a serious opposition challenge.[89] The MDC won the parliamentary race, and only large-scale falsification of the results prevented Tsvangirai from winning the presidency (official results gave Tsvangirai 48 percent, compared to 43 percent for Mugabe, forcing a runoff).[90] To avoid a second round defeat, ZANU launched a massive

[86] As one ex-police official put it, "Most of the police I interact with…hate the government. But they will carry out orders" (*New York Times*, March 30, 2007, p. A4).

[87] *Africa Today*, February 2004, p. 21.

[88] Bratton and Masunungure (2006). Although the operation cost public support, it "met the government's primary objective of pre-empting an anti-state uprising" (Bratton and Masunungure 2006: 41-44).

[89] *Africa Research Bulletin*, April 2008, p. 17484; also Human Rights Watch (2008a).

[90] *Africa Research Bulletin*, March 2008, pp. 17448-17449; April 2008, p. 17484. Also Human Rights Watch (2008a, 2008b).

wave of violence that forced the MDC to withdraw from the race.[91] Despite widespread international calls for Mugabe's resignation, ZANU held firm. Internationally-sponsored negotiations eventually produced a "unity government" in which Tsvangirai became Prime Minister, but ZANU retained control of the presidency and the coercive apparatus.

Zimbabwe is thus an extraordinary case of regime durability. Despite facing an unprecedented economic collapse, a decade of international isolation, and what was arguably the strongest opposition among our four cases (see Lebas forthcoming), ZANU and the regime remained intact through 2010. Led by veterans from the liberation struggle, ZANU and the security forces remained sufficiently disciplined to repeatedly beat back repeated opposition challenges.

Mozambique

Like Zimbabwe, Mozambique is a case of competitive authoritarian stability, rooted in cohesive party structures that emerged out of a violent anti-colonial struggle and civil war. The cohesion of the ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) limited elite defection and facilitated incumbent control over state institutions, which allowed Frelimo to survive internationally-sponsored elections in 1994 and reconsolidate power in the late 1990s and 2000s.

[91]Hundreds of MDC activists were arrested, and more than 2000 people were beaten and tortured in "re-education" meetings. Overall, at least 36 MDC activists were killed. See Human Rights Watch (2008b) and *Africa Research Bulletin*, April 2008, p. 17484-17486.

Party Origins and Ascent to Power

Like Zimbabwe, single party rule Mozambique was rooted in armed struggle. Created in 1962, Frelimo led a prolonged and violent insurgency against Portuguese colonial rule (1964-1974).[92] Like ZANU, Frelimo was "profoundly influenced by the experience of the independence struggle" (Carbone 2003: 5; also Henriksen 1978). The war against Portuguese rule transformed Frelimo from a "loosely organized nationalist front" into a disciplined, ideologically committed vanguard party.[93] Thus, the party's "most dedicated militants [sprang] from those directly involved in the armed struggle" (Henriksen 1983: 216). War also created a "military ethos" that pervaded the party long after it won power in 1975 (Alexander 1997: 3). Frelimo experienced another round of violent conflict after independence, when an insurgency by the South African-backed Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) plunged Mozambique into a bloody 17-year civil war that left an estimated 700,000 dead (Austin 1994).

The liberation struggle clearly strengthened Frelimo as an organization. After 1975, Frelimo transformed its guerrilla networks into a robust grassroots infrastructure, with cells that could be found, at least nominally, "in the most remote rural areas and in every enterprise" (Manning 2005: 230). Although the party's grassroots structures languished somewhat after the end of single party rule (Manning 2005: 230-231), it maintained 30,000 *celulas* and more than one million members in

[92] While Frelimo was never able to defeat the Portuguese militarily, its operations contributed to "war weariness" that "was one of the main causes" of the 1974 Portuguese military coup and retreat from colonial rule (Henriksen 1983: 210).

[93]Henriksen (1983: 213); Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 86);.Munslow (1983: 82). Simpson (1993); Alden (2001: 115). The key moment of transition came in 1969 when nationalist moderates were excluded from the party. Following the assassination of founder Eduardo Mondlane that same year, Frelimo's military commander, Samora Machel, took control of the party (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 97-9; Munslow 1983: 110-12; Newitt 1995: 325-7). At this point, Frelimo "moved sharply to the left" and became "a remarkably cohesive party" (Newitt 1995: 542, 545).

the 1990s (Carbone 2003: 9-10, 2005: 430; Carter Center 2005: 30-31). Crucially, decades of violent conflict had "produced a powerfully disciplined, unusually mature political movement with a leadership deeply committed to the idea of unity" (1992: 111). The impact of the liberation struggle was seen in the predominance of ex-guerrilla fighters (*antigos combatentes)* in the Frelimo leadership: in 1989, 9 of 10 politburo members were veterans of the liberation struggle (Finnegan 1992: 111), and through 1995, all party general secretaries were *antigos combatentes* (Manning 2005: 231). Viewed as "guarantors of superior ethics…in the face of the new and allegedly more corruptible politicians brought to the fore by multiparty politics," the *antigos combatentes* were "accorded unquestioned leadership and privileges," and they remained influential in the party leadership throughout the 1990s (Carbone 2003: 5; Manning 2005: 234).

Finally, the security forces—created by Frelimo at independence—remained closely linked to the ruling party (Seegers 1996: 145; Malache et al. 2005: 162-163, 169); Baker 2003: 149). Although the army was restructured as part of the 1992 peace accords, the police, which served as the regime's main internal security force, remained intact (Chachiua 2000: Leao 2004). Dominated by Frelimo, the police hierarchy maintained "a strong *esprit de corps*," with a "sense of solidarity rooted in a history of political struggle" (Rauch and van der Spuy 2006: 112).

In sum, although Mozambique lacked Zimbabwe's powerful coercive apparatus, it shared with Zimbabwe a cohesive ruling party that emerged out of a long and violent liberations struggle. As we shall see, this cohesion would enable to survive the transition to multiparty rule in the 1990s and eventually reconsolidate power in the 2000s.

Crisis and Regime Response

Frelimo faced a major challenge with the end of the Cold War. After a 15 year civil war that devastated the economy and left an estimated 700,000 dead (Austin 1994), and desperate for assistance in the wake of the Soviet retreat, Frelimo turned to the West after 1990 (Plank 1993; Simpson 1993). Under "immense pressure" from the international community (Harrison 1996: 20), the Frelimo government was forced to adopt a multiparty constitution and enter internationally-sponsored peace negotiations with Renamo (Alden and Simpson 1993; Simpson 1993). Under the 1992 Rome Accords, Renamo was legalized and presidential elections were eventually held in 1994.

The 1992-94 transition was subject to heavy international intervention, including the presence of 7000 UN troops, which helped ensure a free and relatively fair election.[94] International actors ensured the selection of a non-partisan head of the electoral commission, as well as opposition access to finance and the media (Alden 2001: 46; Manning 2002b: 168).[95] Finally, some 2500 foreign observers monitored the election, and the UN worked to place "at least four trained observers" at virtually every polling station (Turner et al. 1998: 157).[96] Finally, Frelimo faced a unified opposition in Renamo. Unlike KANU and UNIP, however, Frelimo survived the transition to multipartyism—and the prospect of a clean election—without suffering any significant defections. In elections that were widely considered free,[97] President

[94]See Turner et al. (1998); Alden (2001); Manning (2002b: 168-170).

[95]Renamo received roughly $15 million in external finance, aimed at compensating for Frelimo's huge advantage in business contributions (Isaacs 1993: 42; Turner et al. 1998: 160).

[96]Also Lloyd (1995: 154); Manning (2002b: 169-170). The vote-counting process was particularly well scrutinized. Ballots were counted at the local and provincial levels, and they were then flown to Maputo to be "scrutinized for a third time" (Isaacs 1995: 21; Turner et al. 1998: 162).

[97] Manning (2002b)

Joaquim Chissano defeated Renamo leader Alonso Dhlakama by a margin of 53 percent to 34 percent, and Frelimo won a narrow parliamentary majority.[98]

The 1999 elections posed another serious challenge. The presidential race, which again pitted Chissano against Dhlakama, was much closer than that of 1994, and indeed, it may have been stolen.[99] Frelimo massively abused state resources, and independent observers raised "serious doubts…regarding the probity of the [vote] counting process" (Manning 2005: 241). Chissano was declared the winner by a small margin, and Frelimo again captured a narrow parliamentary majority.[100] Renamo rejected the election and subsequently boycotted parliament, and in November 2000, opposition street demonstrations were violently repressed by police, resulting in more than 40 deaths.[101] Again, Frelimo remained intact throughout the electoral process, and the Frelimo-dominated police carried out orders to repress in a disciplined manner.

Frelimo reconsolidated power in the 2000s, for at least two reasons. First, international scrutiny "dropped off dramatically" (Manning 2001b: 6, 2002b: 185-191). Second, Frelimo remained cohesive in the face of Renamo challenges (Alden 2001: 115). Iron-clad party discipline, reinforced by the predominance of the "historic generation," allowed Frelimo to retain firm control of parliament (Manning 2002a: 67-69; 2005: 234-235), which prevented nominally independent institutions (such as judicial and electoral authorities) from becoming effective checks on executive power (Manning 2001a: 154; Lala and Ostheimer 2003: 33).

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[98] Frelimo won 129 of 250 seats, compared to 112 for Renamo.

[99] See Manning (2002b: 194-199); de Brito (2007: 1); *Africa Confidential* 4 February 2000, p. 5.

[100] Chissano won 52 percent of the vote, compared to 48 percent for Dhlakama, and Frelimo captured 133 of 250 seats in parliament.

[101] Manning (2002c: 79)

Frelimo's strength was made manifest after 2001, when President Chissano announced his decision to respect term limits and not seek re-election in 2004. The Frelimo Central Committee selected Armando Guebuza, a member of the "historic generation," as the party's 2004 presidential candidate. Unlike Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia, where presidential succession threw weaker parties into crisis, Frelimo's succession was remarkably smooth, as the party quickly rallied behind Guebuza (de Brito 2007). The 2004 presidential election was marred by "serious irregularities," including ballot stuffing and manipulation of the vote count.[102] Unlike previous elections, Frelimo won easily: Guebuza defeated Dhlakama with 64 percent of the vote, and the ruling party won 160 of 250 seats in parliament. In 2009, Guebuza was re-elected in a landslide (defeating Dhlakama by a margin of 76 percent to 16 percent), leading *Africa Confidential* to observe that "Frelimo's grip over the country is now total."[103]

In sum, unlike ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia, Frelimo survived the transition to multiparty rule in 1992-94 and a presidential leadership succession in 2004. Nearly two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has reconsolidated its dominant party status. This resilience is explained, in part, by strikingly high levels of elite cohesion, which can be traced back to Frelimo's origins as an armed liberation movement.

Conclusion

This paper has sought to explain the considerable variation in the durability of party-based authoritarian regimes. In particular, it highlighted the importance of non-material sources of partisan cohesion in ensuring authoritarian stability. Whereas much of the literature assumes

[102] See Carter Center (2005: 12, 31-39, 51-52)

[103] *Africa Confidential* 6 November 2009.

that authoritarian ruling parties are organized around patronage,[104] we argue that patronage is neither the only nor the most effective source of ruling party cohesion. Although institutionalized patronage is a fairly reliable source of cohesion during normal times, patronage-based parties are often vulnerable to crises generated by economic shocks (Zambia) or leadership succession (e.g., Kenya). By contrast, ruling parties that combine patronage with non-material sources of cohesion, particularly a shared history of violent struggle (e.g., Mozambique, Zimbabwe), have a greater capacity to survive crises. Such non-material bonds strengthen intra-elite trust and increase the likelihood that party cadres will remain united and disciplined during periods of uncertainty. Revolutionary or liberation struggles also tend to produce a generation of leaders—such as the *antigos combatentes* in Mozambique—that possesses the necessary legitimacy to impose discipline during crises. Such cohesion is a more important product of struggle than organizational scope, which is the focus of analyses by Huntington (1970) and Smith (2005). Thus, KANU and UNIP collapsed not because they lacked extensive institutions of mobilization – but because elites controlling these institutions defected from the regime.

Although this paper focused on only four cases, its claims appear to be generalizable.[105] Other established patronage-based ruling parties that suffered large-scale defection and defeat in post-Cold War Africa include the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in Malawi and the Socialist Party (PS) in Senegal. Patronage-based parties that survived through 2010 either did not face severe crises or opposition challenges (Tanzania, Botswana) or benefited from timely external assistance from France (Cameroon, Gabon). New patronage-based ruling parties, such as the MMD in Zambia, the UDF in Malawi, and ADEMA in Mali, also experienced severe internal

[104]Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2007a); Magaloni (2008); Reuter and Remington (2009).

[105]See, for example, Levitsky and Way (2010).

crises and, in some cases (Malawi, Mali), lost power. By contrast, new ruling parties that emerged from violent struggle, such as SWAPO in Namibia, the EPRDF in Ethiopia, and perhaps the RPF in Rwanda, appear to be more durable.

Moving beyond Africa, it is probably not a coincidence that all of the communist regimes that survived into the post-Cold War period—China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Vietnam—emerged out of armed conflict and/or indigenous revolution. Regime survival was particularly striking in Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea, which confronted severe economic crises in the wake of the USSR's demise, and China, which faced large-scale opposition protest in 1989. In each of these cases, cohesive party structures with close ties to a powerful coercive apparatus provided governments with effective tools for facing down these challenges.

It is clear, then, that variation in ruling party strength matters (Smith 2005). It is also clear that this variation is rooted in historical processes over which individual rulers exert relatively little control.[106] Autocratic rulers frequently do not choose their parties, and rarely can they "choose" to build strong and cohesive parties. Such parties are, in most cases, exogenously created: they are a product of war, revolutionary or liberation struggles, or successful counter-insurgency.[107] Autocrats who lack such parties cannot simply build them from scratch. Rather, they must generally choose between a relatively loose patronage-based organization (e.g., Putin in Russia, Shevardnadze in Georgia) and no ruling party at all (Kuchma in Ukraine, Lukashenka in Belarus). The determinants of *that* choice merits further research.

[106]See, for example, Huntington (1970), Smith (2005), and Slater and Smith (2009).

[107]See Huntington (1970); Slater and Smith (2009).