

# FLS 6415 - Causal Inference for the Political Economy of Development

Week 11 - Collective Action & Comparative Cases

Jonathan Phillips

November 2017

# Review of Large-N Causal Inference

- ▶ How to analyze data for causal inference:

# Review of Large-N Causal Inference

- ▶ How to analyze data for causal inference:
  1. Causal Inference logic -> Regression Structure

## Review of Large-N Causal Inference

- ▶ How to analyze data for causal inference:
  1. Causal Inference logic -> Regression Structure
  2. Outcome Type -> Regression Model

## Review of Large-N Causal Inference


- ▶ How to analyze data for causal inference:
  1. Causal Inference logic -> Regression Structure
  2. Outcome Type -> Regression Model
  3. Treatment scale & Outcome scale -> Interpretation

# Treatment Assignment Mechanisms

## Analysis Types and Assumptions

Week		Researcher Controls Treatment Assignment?	Treatment Assignment Independent of Potential Outcomes	SUTVA	Additional Assumptions
	<b>Controlled Experiments</b>				
1	Field Experiments	✓	✓	✓	
2	Survey and Lab Experiments	✓	✓	✓	Controlled Environment for treatment exposure
	<b>Natural Experiments</b>				
3	Randomized Natural Experiments	X	✓	✓	Compliance with Randomization
4	Instrumental Variables	X	✓	✓	First stage and Exclusion Restriction (Instrument explains treatment but not outcome)
5	Regression Discontinuity	X	✓	✓	Continuity of covariates; No manipulation; No compounding discontinuities
	<b>Observational Studies</b>				
6	Difference-in-Differences	X	X	✓	No Time-varying confounders; Parallel Trends
7	Controlling for Confounding	X	X	✓	Blocking all Back-door paths
8	Matching	X	X	✓	Overlap in sample characteristics

# Regression Structure



## Outcome Variable Type

- ▶ Continuous -> Ordinary Least Squares

```
zelig(Formula, data=data, model="ls")
```

- ▶ Binary -> Logit

```
zelig(Formula, data=data, model="logit")
```

- ▶ Unordered categories -> Multinomial logit

```
zelig(Formula, data=data, model="mlogit")
```

- ▶ Ordered categories -> Ordered logit

```
zelig(Formula, data=data, model="ologit")
```



## Interpretation

- ▶ **For OLS regression:**
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $\beta$  [unit2] change in the outcome
- ▶ unit1 : Same units as treatment variable
  - ▶ Unless treatment is log(), then unit1 is 1% and unit2 is  $\beta * \ln(\frac{101}{100})$  (not %)
  - ▶ Which is almost the same as  $\frac{\beta}{100}$  (not %)
- ▶ unit2 : Same units as outcome variable
  - ▶ Unless outcome is log(), then unit2 is  $100 * (\exp(\beta) - 1)\%$
  - ▶ Which is almost the same as  $100 * \beta\%$

## Interpretation

```
zelig(mpg ~ wt, data=mtcars, model="ls")
```

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	mpg
wt	-5.344*** (0.559)
Constant	37.285*** (1.878)
Observations	32
R <sup>2</sup>	0.753
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.745
Residual Std. Error	2.016 (df = 29)

## Interpretation

```
zelig(mpg log(wt), data=mtcars, model="ls")
```

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	mpg
wt	-17.086*** (1.510)
Constant	39.257*** (1.758)
Observations	32
R <sup>2</sup>	0.810
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.804
Residual Std. Error	2.660 (df = 29)

## Interpretation

```
zelig(log(mpg) ~ wt, data=mtcars, model="ls")
```

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
log(mpg)	
wt	-0.272*** (0.025)
Constant	3.832*** (0.084)
Observations	32
R <sup>2</sup>	0.798
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.791
Residual Std. Error	0.126 (df = 29)

## Interpretation

- ▶ **For Logit regression:**
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $\beta$  change in the log-odds of the outcome

## Interpretation

- ▶ **For Logit regression:**
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $\beta$  change in the log-odds of the outcome
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $100 * (\exp^{\beta} - 1)\%$  change in the odds (relative probability) of the outcome

## Interpretation

```
zelig(am wt, data=mtcars, model="logit") mtcars
```

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
am	
wt	-0.353*** (0.067)
Constant	1.542*** (0.226)
Observations	32
R <sup>2</sup>	0.480
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.462
Residual Std. Error	0.266 (df = 29)

## Interpretation

- ▶ **For Ordered Logit regression:**
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $\beta$  change in the log-odds of moving up one unit on the outcome scale



## Interpretation

- ▶ **For Ordered Logit regression:**
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $\beta$  change in the log-odds of moving up one unit on the outcome scale
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $100 * (\exp^{\beta} - 1)\%$  change in the odds (relative probability) of moving up one unit on on the outcome scale

## Interpretation

```
zelig(cyl ~ wt, data=mtcars, model="ologit")
```

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
cyl	
wt	5.186*** (1.506)
Observations	32

*Note:* \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

## Interpretation

- ▶ **For Unordered Logit regression:**
- ▶ If there are  $C$  outcome categories, we get  $C - 1$  coefficients on each treatment variable

## Interpretation

- ▶ **For Unordered Logit regression:**
- ▶ If there are  $C$  outcome categories, we get  $C - 1$  coefficients on each treatment variable
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $\beta_C$  change in the log-odds of this outcome category compared to the base category

## Interpretation

- ▶ **For Unordered Logit regression:**
- ▶ If there are  $C$  outcome categories, we get  $C - 1$  coefficients on each treatment variable
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $\beta_C$  change in the log-odds of this outcome category compared to the base category
- ▶ A 1 [unit1] change in treatment [causes/is associated with] a  $100 * (\exp(\beta_C) - 1)$  change in the odds (relative probability) of this outcome category compared to the base category

## Interpretation

```
zelig(color wt, data=mtcars, model="mlogit")
```

```
[1] "Black" "Blue" "Red" "Silver"
```

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z )
(Intercept):1	0.236	1.768	0.134	0.894
(Intercept):2	0.858	1.769	0.485	0.628
(Intercept):3	-0.834	1.800	-0.463	0.643
wt:1	-0.074	0.530	-0.139	0.889
wt:2	-0.276	0.545	-0.505	0.613
wt:3	0.249	0.517	0.482	0.630

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Necessary when there are few measurable cases of our treatment/outcome

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Necessary when there are few measurable cases of our treatment/outcome
- ▶ **Exactly** the same causal inference logic as Large-N



## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Necessary when there are few measurable cases of our treatment/outcome
- ▶ **Exactly** the same causal inference logic as Large-N
- ▶ We need counterfactuals to estimate treatment effects:  
**Comparative Cases**

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Necessary when there are few measurable cases of our treatment/outcome
- ▶ **Exactly** the same causal inference logic as Large-N
- ▶ We need counterfactuals to estimate treatment effects:  
**Comparative Cases**
- ▶ Even if we can 'observe' the causal process, we can easily make mistakes

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Necessary when there are few measurable cases of our treatment/outcome
- ▶ **Exactly** the same causal inference logic as Large-N
- ▶ We need counterfactuals to estimate treatment effects:  
**Comparative Cases**
- ▶ Even if we can 'observe' the causal process, we can easily make mistakes
- ▶ The aim is to go beyond description

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Why can't we achieve causal inference from single case studies?

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Why can't we achieve causal inference from single case studies?
- ▶ If we truly have only one 'treated' observation, we *cannot* know what would have happened in the absence of treatment

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Why can't we achieve causal inference from single case studies?
- ▶ If we truly have only one 'treated' observation, we *cannot* know what would have happened in the absence of treatment
- ▶ These case studies can help *generate* hypotheses...

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Why can't we achieve causal inference from single case studies?
- ▶ If we truly have only one 'treated' observation, we *cannot* know what would have happened in the absence of treatment
- ▶ These case studies can help *generate* hypotheses...
- ▶ And they can maybe reject or weaken a theory...

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Why can't we achieve causal inference from single case studies?
- ▶ If we truly have only one 'treated' observation, we *cannot* know what would have happened in the absence of treatment
- ▶ These case studies can help *generate* hypotheses...
- ▶ And they can maybe reject or weaken a theory...
- ▶ But they cannot **confirm** a theory



## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Why can't we achieve causal inference from single case studies?
- ▶ If we truly have only one 'treated' observation, we *cannot* know what would have happened in the absence of treatment
- ▶ These case studies can help *generate* hypotheses...
- ▶ And they can maybe reject or weaken a theory...
- ▶ But they cannot **confirm** a theory
- ▶ We need variation in the dependent variable if we are to explain it

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Why can't we achieve causal inference from single case studies?
- ▶ If we truly have only one 'treated' observation, we *cannot* know what would have happened in the absence of treatment
- ▶ These case studies can help *generate* hypotheses...
- ▶ And they can maybe reject or weaken a theory...
- ▶ But they cannot **confirm** a theory
- ▶ We need variation in the dependent variable if we are to explain it
- ▶ Common error: "research that tries to explain the outbreak of war with studies only of wars" (KKV)

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Similarities with Large-N:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Similarities with Large-N:
  - ▶ Same challenges to inference: confounding, selection, reverse causation

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Similarities with Large-N:
  - ▶ Same challenges to inference: confounding, selection, reverse causation
  - ▶ Same assumptions required: SUTVA, Balance on all confounders

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Similarities with Large-N:
  - ▶ Same challenges to inference: confounding, selection, reverse causation
  - ▶ Same assumptions required: SUTVA, Balance on all confounders
- ▶ Differences with Large-N:
  - ▶ Fewer comparisons: No uncertainty measure or confidence intervals. What's our standard of evidence?

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Similarities with Large-N:
  - ▶ Same challenges to inference: confounding, selection, reverse causation
  - ▶ Same assumptions required: SUTVA, Balance on all confounders
- ▶ Differences with Large-N:
  - ▶ Fewer comparisons: No uncertainty measure or confidence intervals. What's our standard of evidence?
    - ▶ p-values aren't the only source of credibility (Slater and Ziblatt 2013)

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Similarities with Large-N:
  - ▶ Same challenges to inference: confounding, selection, reverse causation
  - ▶ Same assumptions required: SUTVA, Balance on all confounders
- ▶ Differences with Large-N:
  - ▶ Fewer comparisons: No uncertainty measure or confidence intervals. What's our standard of evidence?
    - ▶ p-values aren't the only source of credibility (Slater and Ziblatt 2013)
  - ▶ Statistical Inference: Non-random cases, so generalization is harder



## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Similarities with Large-N:
  - ▶ Same challenges to inference: confounding, selection, reverse causation
  - ▶ Same assumptions required: SUTVA, Balance on all confounders
- ▶ Differences with Large-N:
  - ▶ Fewer comparisons: No uncertainty measure or confidence intervals. What's our standard of evidence?
    - ▶ p-values aren't the only source of credibility (Slater and Ziblatt 2013)
  - ▶ Statistical Inference: Non-random cases, so generalization is harder
  - ▶ Harder to balance confounders: More variables than cases!

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ In a small-N study, what causal inference technique is most useful?

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ In a small-N study, what causal inference technique is most useful?
  - ▶ Diff-in-diff plausible if we have time-series data

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ In a small-N study, what causal inference technique is most useful?
  - ▶ Diff-in-diff plausible if we have time-series data
  - ▶ IV may be possible if there is some as-if random assignment, eg. leader death from cancer

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ In a small-N study, what causal inference technique is most useful?
  - ▶ Diff-in-diff plausible if we have time-series data
  - ▶ IV may be possible if there is some as-if random assignment, eg. leader death from cancer
  - ▶ Or an RDD, eg. just missing out on WB loans due to GDP measure

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ But most commonly, we are using a matching strategy:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ But most commonly, we are using a matching strategy:
  - ▶ Matching to ensure balance on confounders through case selection - prune unmatched cases

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ But most commonly, we are using a matching strategy:
  - ▶ Matching to ensure balance on confounders through case selection - prune unmatched cases
  - ▶ Clearly we can't match on everything, so focus on getting balance on key confounders/alternative theories



## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ But most commonly, we are using a matching strategy:
  - ▶ Matching to ensure balance on confounders through case selection - prune unmatched cases
  - ▶ Clearly we can't match on everything, so focus on getting balance on key confounders/alternative theories
- ▶ **Our Large-N dataset after matching might look very similar to a comparative case study**

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
- ▶ Don't confuse two distinct considerations in choosing cases:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
- ▶ Don't confuse two distinct considerations in choosing cases:
  1. Causal Inference (internal validity) - can our cases tell us with confidence that  $D$  causes  $Y$ ?

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
- ▶ Don't confuse two distinct considerations in choosing cases:
  1. Causal Inference (internal validity) - can our cases tell us with confidence that  $D$  causes  $Y$ ?
  2. Population Inference (external validity) - How much can we generalize about this causal effect to a broader population?
- ▶ Ideally we want both: Control and representative variation
  - ▶ Our goal is not to explain why revolution happened in Iran, but why it happens generally

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Random sampling is fine! It directly helps us generalize

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Random sampling is fine! It directly helps us generalize
  - ▶ And it helps us avoid explicit bias in causal inference



## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Random sampling is fine! It directly helps us generalize
  - ▶ And it helps us avoid explicit bias in causal inference
  - ▶ But:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Random sampling is fine! It directly helps us generalize
  - ▶ And it helps us avoid explicit bias in causal inference
  - ▶ But:
    - ▶ Randomization does not guarantee enough variation in the treatment and outcome in small samples

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:

- ▶ Random sampling is fine! It directly helps us generalize
- ▶ And it helps us avoid explicit bias in causal inference
- ▶ But:
  - ▶ Randomization does not guarantee enough variation in the treatment and outcome in small samples
  - ▶ Randomization does not guarantee balance on confounders in small samples

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Random sampling is fine! It directly helps us generalize
  - ▶ And it helps us avoid explicit bias in causal inference
  - ▶ But:
    - ▶ Randomization does not guarantee enough variation in the treatment and outcome in small samples
    - ▶ Randomization does not guarantee balance on confounders in small samples
    - ▶ Randomized sampling is not the same as randomized treatment
  - ▶ So even if we randomize, need to check for balance and variation

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Random sampling is fine! It directly helps us generalize
  - ▶ And it helps us avoid explicit bias in causal inference
  - ▶ But:
    - ▶ Randomization does not guarantee enough variation in the treatment and outcome in small samples
    - ▶ Randomization does not guarantee balance on confounders in small samples
    - ▶ Randomized sampling is not the same as randomized treatment
  - ▶ So even if we randomize, need to check for balance and variation
  - ▶ Probably easier to 'block' on key confounders and impose variation in treatment - purposive sampling

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ **DO NOT** select cases by the value of the outcome (Geddes)

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ **DO NOT** select cases by the value of the outcome (Geddes)
  - ▶ If we only study success cases, we don't know the counterfactual



## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ **DO NOT** select cases by the value of the outcome (Geddes)
  - ▶ If we only study success cases, we don't know the counterfactual
  - ▶ The 'treatment' may also have been present in the 'control' cases

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ **DO NOT** select cases by the value of the outcome (Geddes)
  - ▶ If we only study success cases, we don't know the counterfactual
  - ▶ The 'treatment' may also have been present in the 'control' cases
  - ▶ We want to explain interesting things, so we often pick 'extreme' cases, but the extremeness might reflect confounders, not the treatment

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ **DO NOT** select cases by the value of the outcome (Geddes)
  - ▶ If we only study success cases, we don't know the counterfactual
  - ▶ The 'treatment' may also have been present in the 'control' cases
  - ▶ We want to explain interesting things, so we often pick 'extreme' cases, but the extremeness might reflect confounders, not the treatment
  - ▶ But: If we select cases explicitly for a *range* of values of the outcome, that's better

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Case selection also requires properly defining our population/sample

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Case selection also requires properly defining our population/sample
  - ▶ We risk 'survival bias' if we only look at 'active' cases

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Case selection also requires properly defining our population/sample
  - ▶ We risk 'survival bias' if we only look at 'active' cases
    - ▶ Eg. cases where 'deterrence' fails coincide with poor communication

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Case selection also requires properly defining our population/sample
  - ▶ We risk 'survival bias' if we only look at 'active' cases
    - ▶ Eg. cases where 'deterrence' fails coincide with poor communication
    - ▶ But communication is also poor every second that deterrence worked!



# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Achieving generalizability (population inference) depends on our cases being representative

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Achieving generalizability (population inference) depends on our cases being representative
  - ▶ If we want to compare mens and womens running speeds, **DO NOT** pick Usain Bolt and Florence Griffith-Joyner

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Achieving generalizability (population inference) depends on our cases being representative
  - ▶ If we want to compare mens and womens running speeds, **DO NOT** pick Usain Bolt and Florence Griffith-Joyner
  - ▶ Pick units with 'median' values - or a range of values - on the confounding and outcome variables

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Case Selection:
  - ▶ Achieving generalizability (population inference) depends on our cases being representative
  - ▶ If we want to compare mens and womens running speeds, **DO NOT** pick Usain Bolt and Florence Griffith-Joyner
  - ▶ Pick units with 'median' values - or a range of values - on the confounding and outcome variables
  - ▶ Do this at the same time as balancing confounders - hard!

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ **Most similar cases:** Same covariates, different treatment value

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ **Most similar cases:** Same covariates, different treatment value
- ▶ BUT If there are many sets of 'most similar' paired cases, which should we pick?

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ **Most similar cases:** Same covariates, different treatment value
- ▶ BUT If there are many sets of 'most similar' paired cases, which should we pick?
  - ▶ **Typical cases:** Most representative paired cases on covariates, eg. Levitsky and Way



## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ **Most similar cases:** Same covariates, different treatment value
- ▶ BUT If there are many sets of 'most similar' paired cases, which should we pick?
  - ▶ **Typical cases:** Most representative paired cases on covariates, eg. Levitsky and Way
  - ▶ **Diverse cases:** Covering all values of treatment and covariates, eg. Slater

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ **Most similar cases:** Same covariates, different treatment value
- ▶ BUT If there are many sets of 'most similar' paired cases, which should we pick?
  - ▶ **Typical cases:** Most representative paired cases on covariates, eg. Levitsky and Way
  - ▶ **Diverse cases:** Covering all values of treatment and covariates, eg. Slater
  - ▶ **Extreme cases:** Highest and lowest values of treatment, eg. Lieberman

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Methods for alternative objectives:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Methods for alternative objectives:
  - ▶ **Deviant cases:** If you want to disprove a theory or generate a new hypothesis

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Methods for alternative objectives:
  - ▶ **Deviant cases:** If you want to disprove a theory or generate a new hypothesis
  - ▶ **Most different cases:** When searching for a hypothesis to explain  $Y$

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Methods for alternative objectives:
  - ▶ **Deviant cases:** If you want to disprove a theory or generate a new hypothesis
  - ▶ **Most different cases:** When searching for a hypothesis to explain  $Y$
  - ▶ **Influential cases:** How sensitive is our relationship to mismeasurement of a key case?

# Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Three forms of mixed methods:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Three forms of mixed methods:
  1. Large-N measurement supports case selection for Small-N analysis (Seawright and Gerring)



## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Three forms of mixed methods:
  1. Large-N measurement supports case selection for Small-N analysis (Seawright and Gerring)
  2. Small-N study to identify relationship, then tested for generalizability in Large-N sample (Lieberman)

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Three forms of mixed methods:
  1. Large-N measurement supports case selection for Small-N analysis (Seawright and Gerring)
  2. Small-N study to identify relationship, then tested for generalizability in Large-N sample (Lieberman)
  3. Large-N analysis to show causal mechanism within-case, then generalized using comparative case studies (Ziblatt and Slater)

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Strategies for increasing the number of observations:

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Strategies for increasing the number of observations:
  1. Additional measurable implications of the causal theory

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Strategies for increasing the number of observations:
  1. Additional measurable implications of the causal theory
  2. Subnational units

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Strategies for increasing the number of observations:
  1. Additional measurable implications of the causal theory
  2. Subnational units
  3. Time-series

## Comparative Case Studies

- ▶ Strategies for increasing the number of observations:
  1. Additional measurable implications of the causal theory
  2. Subnational units
  3. Time-series
  4. Alternative measures

## Collective Action

- ▶ How do individuals organize to achieve shared goals?



## Collective Action

- ▶ How do individuals organize to achieve shared goals?
- ▶ When do they succeed in achieving those goals?

## Collective Action

- ▶ How do individuals organize to achieve shared goals?
- ▶ When do they succeed in achieving those goals?
- ▶ Many processes of collective action are national in scope and have few cases

## Collective Action

- ▶ How do individuals organize to achieve shared goals?
- ▶ When do they succeed in achieving those goals?
- ▶ Many processes of collective action are national in scope and have few cases
  - ▶ Elite loyalty

## Collective Action

- ▶ How do individuals organize to achieve shared goals?
- ▶ When do they succeed in achieving those goals?
- ▶ Many processes of collective action are national in scope and have few cases
  - ▶ Elite loyalty
  - ▶ Protest

## Collective Action

- ▶ How do individuals organize to achieve shared goals?
- ▶ When do they succeed in achieving those goals?
- ▶ Many processes of collective action are national in scope and have few cases
  - ▶ Elite loyalty
  - ▶ Protest
  - ▶ Tax compliance

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ What is their theory?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ What is their theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ What is their theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?
  - ▶ How generalizable are the findings?



## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ What is their theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?
  - ▶ How generalizable are the findings?
  - ▶ How did they select their cases?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ When do authoritarian parties collapse? (No specific treatment variable)

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ When do authoritarian parties collapse? (No specific treatment variable)
  - ▶ Does a ruling party that emerged from violent revolution cause a lower risk of authoritarian party collapse? (Specific treatment variable)

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ When do authoritarian parties collapse? (No specific treatment variable)
  - ▶ Does a ruling party that emerged from violent revolution cause a lower risk of authoritarian party collapse? (Specific treatment variable)
  - ▶ Does a [ruling party that emerged from violent revolution] cause a [lower risk of authoritarian party collapse]?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Causal theory/mechanisms that affect collective action:

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Causal theory/mechanisms that affect collective action:
  - ▶ Clearer group boundaries and solidarity

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Causal theory/mechanisms that affect collective action:
  - ▶ Clearer group boundaries and solidarity
  - ▶ Leader legitimacy

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Causal theory/mechanisms that affect collective action:
  - ▶ Clearer group boundaries and solidarity
  - ▶ Leader legitimacy
  - ▶ Raising the moral and social costs of defection



## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Causal theory/mechanisms that affect collective action:
  - ▶ Clearer group boundaries and solidarity
  - ▶ Leader legitimacy
  - ▶ Raising the moral and social costs of defection
  - ▶ Greater 'stomach' for repression

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
  - ▶ **Treatment:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Party formed by violent conflict

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Party formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Control:**



## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Party formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Control:** Party not formed by violent conflict

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Party formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Control:** Party not formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Treatment Assignment:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Party formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Control:** Party not formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** Complex historical processes

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Party formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Control:** Party not formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** Complex historical processes
  - ▶ **Outcome:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** One-Party Competitive Authoritarian regimes during economic crisis (scope condition)
  - ▶ **Sample:** Kenya, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Party formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Control:** Party not formed by violent conflict
  - ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** Complex historical processes
  - ▶ **Outcome:** Regime survival

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Estimating the causal effect is easy:

	Control	Treated
Regime collapse	Kenya, Zambia	
Regime survival		Mozambique, Zimbabwe

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ The 'work' is in measuring the variables and controlling for alternative explanations

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ The 'work' is in measuring the variables and controlling for alternative explanations
  - ▶ Is self-selection a concern? Not so much - hard for a leader to choose their party origins



## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ The 'work' is in measuring the variables and controlling for alternative explanations
  - ▶ Is self-selection a concern? Not so much - hard for a leader to choose their party origins
  - ▶ Confounders are identified from alternative theories that explain the outcome

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ The 'work' is in measuring the variables and controlling for alternative explanations
  - ▶ Is self-selection a concern? Not so much - hard for a leader to choose their party origins
  - ▶ Confounders are identified from alternative theories that explain the outcome
  - ▶ Our cases must be balanced on these variables

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ The 'work' is in measuring the variables and controlling for alternative explanations
  - ▶ Is self-selection a concern? Not so much - hard for a leader to choose their party origins
  - ▶ Confounders are identified from alternative theories that explain the outcome
  - ▶ Our cases must be balanced on these variables
    - ▶ Duration in power

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ The 'work' is in measuring the variables and controlling for alternative explanations
  - ▶ Is self-selection a concern? Not so much - hard for a leader to choose their party origins
  - ▶ Confounders are identified from alternative theories that explain the outcome
  - ▶ Our cases must be balanced on these variables
    - ▶ Duration in power
    - ▶ Strength of opposition

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ The 'work' is in measuring the variables and controlling for alternative explanations
  - ▶ Is self-selection a concern? Not so much - hard for a leader to choose their party origins
  - ▶ Confounders are identified from alternative theories that explain the outcome
  - ▶ Our cases must be balanced on these variables
    - ▶ Duration in power
    - ▶ Strength of opposition
    - ▶ All experienced fiscal crisis

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
  - ▶ The 'work' is in measuring the variables and controlling for alternative explanations
  - ▶ Is self-selection a concern? Not so much - hard for a leader to choose their party origins
  - ▶ Confounders are identified from alternative theories that explain the outcome
  - ▶ Our cases must be balanced on these variables
    - ▶ Duration in power
    - ▶ Strength of opposition
    - ▶ All experienced fiscal crisis

## Collective Action

- ▶ OR the expected bias from the imbalance must make it **less likely** for us to find a treatment effect

## Collective Action

- ▶ OR the expected bias from the imbalance must make it **less likely** for us to find a treatment effect
  - ▶ Eg. Zimbabwe had higher income than Zambia and Kenya so modernization theory would predict regime collapse is **more likely**



## Collective Action

- ▶ OR the expected bias from the imbalance must make it **less likely** for us to find a treatment effect
  - ▶ Eg. Zimbabwe had higher income than Zambia and Kenya so modernization theory would predict regime collapse is **more likely**
  - ▶ And a worse economic crisis also suggests regime collapse more likely...

## Collective Action

- ▶ OR the expected bias from the imbalance must make it **less likely** for us to find a treatment effect
  - ▶ Eg. Zimbabwe had higher income than Zambia and Kenya so modernization theory would predict regime collapse is **more likely**
  - ▶ And a worse economic crisis also suggests regime collapse more likely...
  - ▶ So if the Zimbabwe regime survives, that can't be due to these confounders

## Collective Action

- ▶ OR the expected bias from the imbalance must make it **less likely** for us to find a treatment effect
  - ▶ Eg. Zimbabwe had higher income than Zambia and Kenya so modernization theory would predict regime collapse is **more likely**
  - ▶ And a worse economic crisis also suggests regime collapse more likely...
  - ▶ So if the Zimbabwe regime survives, that can't be due to these confounders

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Case Selection?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Case Selection?
  - ▶ Not ex ante explicit

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Case Selection?
  - ▶ Not ex ante explicit
  - ▶ But designed to achieve balance

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Case Selection?
  - ▶ Not ex ante explicit
  - ▶ But designed to achieve balance
- ▶ Generalizability?
  - ▶ How unusual are Zimbabwe and Mozambique?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Levitsky and Way (2003)
- ▶ Case Selection?
  - ▶ Not ex ante explicit
  - ▶ But designed to achieve balance
- ▶ Generalizability?
  - ▶ How unusual are Zimbabwe and Mozambique?
  - ▶ Can't say much outside of Africa



# Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ What is his theory?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ What is his theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ What is his theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?
  - ▶ How generalizable are the findings?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ What is his theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?
  - ▶ How generalizable are the findings?
  - ▶ How did he select his cases?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Why is it so much harder to collect taxes in Brazil than South Africa?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Why is it so much harder to collect taxes in Brazil than South Africa?
  - ▶ Do salient racial cleavages increase willingness to pay taxes?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries



## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa
  - ▶ **Treatment:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Cross-class racial cleavage

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Cross-class racial cleavage
  - ▶ **Control:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Cross-class racial cleavage
  - ▶ **Control:** Non-racial class cleavage

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Cross-class racial cleavage
  - ▶ **Control:** Non-racial class cleavage
  - ▶ **Treatment Assignment:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Cross-class racial cleavage
  - ▶ **Control:** Non-racial class cleavage
  - ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** History of social relations, constitutional conventions, policies



## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Cross-class racial cleavage
  - ▶ **Control:** Non-racial class cleavage
  - ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** History of social relations, constitutional conventions, policies
  - ▶ **Outcome:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ **Population:** Developing countries
  - ▶ **Sample:** Brazil and South Africa
  - ▶ **Treatment:** Cross-class racial cleavage
  - ▶ **Control:** Non-racial class cleavage
  - ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** History of social relations, constitutional conventions, policies
  - ▶ **Outcome:** Compliance of the rich with direct taxation

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
- ▶ Balancing on Confounders

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
- ▶ Balancing on Confounders
  - ▶ Authoritarian history/democratization

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
- ▶ Balancing on Confounders
  - ▶ Authoritarian history/democratization
  - ▶ Development Strategy

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
- ▶ Balancing on Confounders
  - ▶ Authoritarian history/democratization
  - ▶ Development Strategy
  - ▶ Income levels

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
- ▶ Balancing on Confounders
  - ▶ Authoritarian history/democratization
  - ▶ Development Strategy
  - ▶ Income levels
  - ▶ Income inequality

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
- ▶ Balancing on Confounders
  - ▶ Authoritarian history/democratization
  - ▶ Development Strategy
  - ▶ Income levels
  - ▶ Income inequality
  - ▶ Ethnic diversity



# Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
- ▶ Balancing on Confounders
  - ▶ Authoritarian history/democratization
  - ▶ Development Strategy
  - ▶ Income levels
  - ▶ Income inequality
  - ▶ Ethnic diversity
  - ▶ Wars/International context

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Brazil and South Africa might be imbalanced on the amount of fish they catch

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Brazil and South Africa might be imbalanced on the amount of fish they catch
  - ▶ And there's always a chance that this might matter

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Brazil and South Africa might be imbalanced on the amount of fish they catch
  - ▶ And there's always a chance that this might matter
  - ▶ But if we have balanced all **theoretically-relevant** confounders, that's pretty good

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Brazil and South Africa might be imbalanced on the amount of fish they catch
  - ▶ And there's always a chance that this might matter
  - ▶ But if we have balanced all **theoretically-relevant** confounders, that's pretty good
- ▶ Don't balance on recent indicators of trust, corruption or culture. Why?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Brazil and South Africa might be imbalanced on the amount of fish they catch
  - ▶ And there's always a chance that this might matter
  - ▶ But if we have balanced all **theoretically-relevant** confounders, that's pretty good
- ▶ Don't balance on recent indicators of trust, corruption or culture. Why?
  - ▶ These variables are post-treatment - affected by the national political community

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Complements the comparative case study with a cross-national regression

## Collective Action

- ▶ Lieberman (2003)
  - ▶ Complements the comparative case study with a cross-national regression
  - ▶ Measurement accuracy vs generalizability



# Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ What is his theory?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ What is his theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ What is his theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?
  - ▶ How generalizable are the findings?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ What is his theory?
  - ▶ How do the comparative cases provide supportive evidence?
  - ▶ How generalizable are the findings?
  - ▶ How did he select his cases?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ When does protest occur?

# Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ When does protest occur?
  - ▶ When does protest succeed?

## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ When does protest occur?
  - ▶ When does protest succeed?
  - ▶ Theory: Economic crisis or modernization or a stronger middle-class is not enough: Democrats also have to overcome the collective action problem

## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ When does protest occur?
  - ▶ When does protest succeed?
  - ▶ Theory: Economic crisis or modernization or a stronger middle-class is not enough: Democrats also have to overcome the collective action problem
  - ▶ Does the support of communal elites make mass protest more likely, and more likely to succeed?



## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ Holding region constant

## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ Holding region constant
  - ▶ Balance cases on income / material interests (alternative theory)

## Collective Action

- ▶ Slater (2009)
  - ▶ Holding region constant
  - ▶ Balance cases on income / material interests (alternative theory)
  - ▶ Tries to correct a selection bias in the literature: Scholars measure protest but not the **absence of protest**

# Collective Action

## ► **Population:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia
- ▶ **Treatment:**



## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia
- ▶ **Treatment:** Communal elites support the opposition

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia
- ▶ **Treatment:** Communal elites support the opposition
- ▶ **Control:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia
- ▶ **Treatment:** Communal elites support the opposition
- ▶ **Control:** Communal elites support the regime/split

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia
- ▶ **Treatment:** Communal elites support the opposition
- ▶ **Control:** Communal elites support the regime/split
- ▶ **Treatment Assignment:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia
- ▶ **Treatment:** Communal elites support the opposition
- ▶ **Control:** Communal elites support the regime/split
- ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** Historical processes of colonialism, decolonisation, and authoritarianism

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia
- ▶ **Treatment:** Communal elites support the opposition
- ▶ **Control:** Communal elites support the regime/split
- ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** Historical processes of colonialism, decolonisation, and authoritarianism
- ▶ **Outcome:**

## Collective Action

- ▶ **Population:** Authoritarian regimes
- ▶ **Sample:** 10 country-years in Southeast Asia
- ▶ **Treatment:** Communal elites support the opposition
- ▶ **Control:** Communal elites support the regime/split
- ▶ **Treatment Assignment:** Historical processes of colonialism, decolonisation, and authoritarianism
- ▶ **Outcome:** No protests, failed protests or protest success

# Collective Action

TABLE 1  
COMMUNAL ELITES VERSUS RIVAL EXPLANATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC MOBILIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

	Philippines (1986)	Thailand (1973)	Thailand (1992)	Indonesia (1998)	Indonesia (1978)	Malaysia (1998)	Burma (1988–90)	Burma (2007)	Singapore	Vietnam
Economic development .....	Low-medium	Low-medium	Medium-high	Medium	Low-medium	Medium-high	Low	Low	High	Low-medium
Economic downturn .....	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Stolen election .....	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
International diffusion .....	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Politically autonomous communal elites .....	Yes	Yes	Yes	Split	Split	Split	Split	Split	No	No
Communal elites' predominant posture .....	Opposition	Opposition	Opposition	Opposition	Regime	Regime	Deadlock	Deadlock	Regime	Regime
Mobilization outcome .....	Revolution	Revolution	Revolution	Revolution	Crackdown	Crackdown	Crackdown	Crackdown	Quiescence	Quiescence