FLS 6441 - Methods III: Explanation and Causation Week 8 - Difference-in-Differences

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Classification of Research Designs

		Independence of Treatment Assignment	Researcher Con- trols Treatment Assignment?
Controlled Experiments	Field Experiments	√	√
	Survey and Lab Experiments	√	√
Natural Experiments	Natural Experiments	√	
	Instrumental Variables	√ √	
	Discontinuities	√	
Observational Studies	Difference-in-Differences		
	Controlling for Confounding		
	Matching		
	Comparative Cases and Process Tracing		

Section 1

Difference-in-Differences

What if we have NO variation in treatment that is independent of potential outcomes?

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- ► Then we have an *Observational* study

Difference-in-Differences

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 - BUT Outcomes might change over time for reasons other than treatment ('Overall Trend Bias')

Difference-in-Differences

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 - Even unobserved fixed characteristics


Difference-in-Differences


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
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
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Difference-in-Differences

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
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 - But compare how European growth changed (+0.3%) and UK growth changed (-0.4%)
 - ► The net effect of Brexit is -0.7%

Reversal of fortune: since the EU referendum, strong growth relative to other G7 economies has tailed off





© FT

But can we really say this was the effect of Brexit?


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
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
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- 2. Maybe the UK passed other policies at the same time as Brexit?
 - We have to check there are no compound treatments







Estimating Difference-in-Differences

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β is our Average Treatment Effect estimate

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
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
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
Difference-in-Differences

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
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Estimating Difference-in-Differences

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- Crucial to cluster standard errors by each cross-sectional unit (eg. each country)

Difference-in-Differences


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
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- One test of this is to check if pre-treatment trends are parallel





Difference-in-Differences Assumptions

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The Effect of Illegal Activities on Violence

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- 4. **Group membership is stable** (no migration from control to treatment)

The Effect of Illegal Activities on Violence

Difference-in-Differences

	Time-invariant charac- teristics	Time-varying character- istics	
	Balances 'fixed' cross- sectional characteris- tics	Balances Overall Time Trends	Balances Unit-specific trends
Field Experiments	√	√ 	\checkmark
Survey and Lab Experiments	\checkmark	V	\checkmark
Natural Experiments	√ 	√	1
Instrumental Variables	1	√	1
Regression Discontinuity	\checkmark	V	\checkmark
Cross-sectional comparisons	Х	√	Х
Before-After comparisons	\checkmark	Х	Х
Difference-in-Differences	V	\checkmark	Х

Section 2

The Effect of Illegal Activities on Violence

How does making an activity illegal affect violence?

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- Comparing the *change* in violence in mahogany-growing areas to the change in violence in non-mahogany areas

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
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- Outcome: Homicides per 100,000 people

Multiple treatment timings:

- Partial Ban on Mahogany exports
- Full Ban on Mahogany exports
- 'Reverse' treatment: Better policing of mahogany regulations

Difference-in-Differences



Panel A. Homicides in mahogany and non-mahogany areas

The Effect of Illegal Activities on Violence

Chimeli and Soares 2017

Methodology:

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- Supporting evidence: The 'extra' homicides were the type we'd expect from illegal activity

		BENCHMARK RESULTS						
Variables	Municipalities in states with mahogany occurrence							
					Triple-diff:			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	Treatments interacted with linear trends (4)	State percent in exp. before 1999 (5)	Suspect. state exp. after 1999 (6)		
treat 1999	4.520 [2.627]	8.078 [2.841]	5.946 [2.031]	5.669 [2.586]	17.13 [6.078]	0.0994 [0.0370]		
treat 1999 \times trend				2.409 [1.398]				
treat 2002	7.034 [3.491]	15.03 [3.633]	12.68 [3.650]	15.11 [3.321]	31.13 [7.517]	0.139 [0.0303]		
treat 2002 × trend				-0.0275 [0.556]				
treat 2009	-1.478 [4.521]	9.514 [4.207]	10.81 [4.173]	14.29 [5.369]	22.52 [9.228]	0.371 [0.146]		
treat $2009 \times trend$				-2.387 [1.023]				
State FE × year FE Baseline charact. × year FE		Х	X X	Х	Х	Х		
Observations R^2	11,932 0.645	11,932 0.709	11,533 0.772	11,932 0.710	11,932 0.712	11,932 0.711		

TABLE 2—ILLEGALITY OF MAHOGANY TRADE AND HOMICIDES, 1995–2013, DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE BENCHMARK RESULTS

Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets (clustering at municipality). Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100.000 inhibitant). All regression include a constant, municipality and year dammies, and are weighted by population. Treatment variables are dummies = 1 between 1999–2001, between 2002–2008, and after 2008 interacted with: dummy of mabogany occurring area (columns 1–4); state share in total per-1999 mahogany expects × dummy of mabogany occurring area (columns 5); sum of state exports of mabogany and "other tropical timber species" (which we call "suspected taste exports after 1999) × dummy of mabogany cocurs in grave (column 6). Columns 2 to 6 control for state-specific time dummies. Column 3 controls for interactions of year dummies with basheine (1995) values of the following municipality characteristics: percent of area plated, monthly by hear and circulatory diseases, neoplasms, infectious diseases, traffic accidents, suicides, child mortality, assissinations related to hand constifics (rate), per earling GDP (ln), fraction of GDP in agriculture (the latter 2 measured 11990). Difference-in-Differences

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► Testing for Pre-treatment trends:

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A 'Placebo' treatment in 1997/8: No effect

► Testing for Pre-treatment trends:

- ► A 'Placebo' treatment in 1997/8: No effect
- Also try a low-powered test with unit-specific time trends

Testing for Pre-treatment trends:

- ► A 'Placebo' treatment in 1997/8: No effect
- Also try a low-powered test with unit-specific time trends
 - Doesn't change the results

Variables	Effect on homicides and parallel trends, 1995–2013		Other economic changes, data restricted to 1996, 1999–2010					
	Testing for pre-trend	Municipality linear trend (2)	Dependent variable: Homicide		Dependent variable: GDP per capita		Dependent variable: Percent GDP in agric.	
	(1)		(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
treat 1999	13.55 [6.021]	14.07 [4.345]	10.44 [3.384]	8.577 [5.018]	0.322 [0.134]	0.256 [0.145]	0.0515 [0.0594]	0.0823 [0.0594
treat 2002	23.45 [6.262]	25.96 [5.820]	20.35 [4.989]	16.16 [7.363]	0.461 [0.166]	0.312 [0.174]	0.0182 [0.0648]	0.0874 [0.0607
treat 2009	17.35 [7.062]	22.24 [6.144]	20.94 [8.091]	14.65 [7.293]	0.431 [0.164]	0.207 [0.192]	-0.00712 [0.0725]	0.0967 [0.0644
Placebo	1.728 [4.374]							
Municipality specific trend		Х		Х		Х		Х
Observations R^2	2,432 0.731	2,432 0.801	1,664 0.776	1,664 0.855	1,664 0.942	1,664 0.966	1,664 0.851	1,664 0.916

TABLE 4—ILLEGALITY OF MAHOGANY TRADE AND HOMICIDES, TESTING FOR PARALLEL TRENDS AND OTHER EFFECTS OF REGULATORY CHANGE, MUNICIPALITIES IN PARÁ, DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE

Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets (clustering at municipality). Dependent variable is the homicide rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) in columns 1–4, the log of GDP per capita in columns 5–6, and the share of GDP in agriculture in columns 7–8 (the latter 2 only available for 1996, 1999–2010). All regressions include a constant, municipality, and year dummies, and are weighted by population. Treatment variables are dummise = 1 between 1999–2001, between 2002–2008, and after 2008 interacted with the dummy of the mahogamy-occurring area. Pre-1999 placebo is a dummy for 1997–1998 interacted with mahogany occurring area. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 include, as additional controls, interactions of municipality dummises with a linear time trend. Difference-in-Differences

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Interpretation

Illegal activity prevents 'peaceful' contract enforcement

- Illegal activity prevents 'peaceful' contract enforcement
- Competition between loggers

- Illegal activity prevents 'peaceful' contract enforcement
- Competition between loggers
- Contract enforcement with buyers

- Illegal activity prevents 'peaceful' contract enforcement
- Competition between loggers
- Contract enforcement with buyers
- Intimidation of communities to not report logging